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INTRODUCTION 
For two years, Ewi Sudewo could not go outside.1 Arianti 
Harikusumo never received a dime for the work she did, and her 
employer hit her when she asked for her salary.2 Ani Rukmonto’s 
employer physically and verbally abused her.3 Melda’s employer 
raped her twice in one year, with the police returning her to her 
employer’s house after the first rape.4 All migrant workers, these 
women temporarily lived and worked outside of their native country. 
The fact that their stories are all too common reveals the need to 
examine existing legal protections for women migrant workers, to 
determine if the law provides a framework for ending these abuses.5
 1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MAID TO ORDER: ENDING ABUSES AGAINST 
DOMESTIC MIGRANT WORKERS IN SINGAPORE 47 (2005) [hereinafter MAID TO 
ORDER] (providing Sudewo’s explanation that “[t]he outside door was locked. All 
the doors were locked, only the bathroom was open. The kitchen was locked. For 
one day, one week at a time, I would never eat anything. I was hungry, what could 
I do? . . . I had no day off, I never went outside”). 
 2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HELP WANTED: ABUSES AGAINST FEMALE 
DOMESTIC MIGRANT WORKERS IN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA 42 (2004) 
[hereinafter HELP WANTED] (quoting Harikusumo to introduce the topic of unpaid 
wages when documenting the physical abuse, neglect, and mistreatment endured 
by female domestic migrant workers). 
 3. See id. at 45-46 (quoting Rukmonto’s recollection). 
Every day something made [my employers] angry. Every day the woman hit me 
many times with a wooden stick. Sometimes she slapped me, sometimes she hit me 
with a hanger or a comb, sometimes when I was cooking, she hit my head with 
tools. My body got bruises, I became black from my head to my hips. I never saw a 
doctor. Sometimes I treated the pain myself with a compress, no medicine. When 
the woman hit me, the man was working, he didn’t know. She would say, “If I hit 
you, do not lose consciousness. If you do, I will dig a hole and leave you there so 
nobody knows.” Sometimes when I combed the children’s hair, the woman said, 
“You are a monkey, a donkey.” Sometimes she said I was stupid, or like a bull. I 
didn’t have anyone to turn to and I was afraid. I was beaten every day and swollen. 
I was beaten badly three times, and the third time, my head was bleeding and my 
body broke and then I lost consciousness. 
Id. 
 4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BAD DREAMS: EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE OF 
MIGRANT WORKERS IN SAUDI 60 (2004) [hereinafter BAD DREAMS]. 
 5. See, e.g., HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 37 (reporting that domestic 
NGOs in Indonesia estimate that approximately 18,000–25,000 migrants return 
from countries such as Malaysia each year after suffering abuse). 
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As of 2005, over 190 million people were migrants living outside 
the country in which they were born.6 International law defines a 
migrant worker as “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has 
been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she 
is not a national.”7 Migration flows move from sending states to 
receiving states,8 in part due to structural economic disparities 
among states.9
International watchdogs frequently document human rights abuses 
against migrant workers,10 particularly in the domestic service sector, 
where such abuses are often viewed as an invisible part of an 
economy.11 The fact that migrant workers often see many of their 
human rights violated or unfulfilled is particularly problematic
 6. See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs [DESA], Population Div., Trends 
in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
POP/DB/MIG/Rev.2005/Doc (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ 
population/publications/migration/UN_Migrant_Stock_Documentation_2005.pdf 
[hereinafter Total Migrant Stock]. 
 7. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families art. 2(1), Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 
93 [hereinafter Migrant Workers Convention]. 
 8. In this Article, I use the sending/receiving state terminology, where a 
sending state is a country of origin, while a receiving state is a country of 
destination. 
 9. See Joan Fitzpatrick & Katrina R. Kelly, Gender Aspects of Migration: 
Law and the Female Migrant, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 60-65 
(1998) (describing structural economic disparities and noting Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka are major source countries for East Asian maid 
trade while Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and oil-rich Gulf states constitute 
states receiving women for migrant labor). 
 10. See generally MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1; HELP WANTED, supra note 2; 
BAD DREAMS, supra note 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SWEPT UNDER THE RUG: 
ABUSES AGAINST DOMESTIC WORKERS AROUND THE WORLD (2006) [hereinafter 
SWEPT UNDER THE RUG]; RAY JUREIDINI & NAYLA MOUKARBEL, LEBANESE NGO 
FORUM: THE MIGRATION NETWORK, BRIEF ON FOREIGN FEMALE DOMESTIC MAIDS 
IN LEBANON (2000), http://www.lnf.org.lb/migrationnetwork/mig6.html. 
 11. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Class and Care: The Role of Private Intermediaries 
in the In-Home Care Industry in the United States and Israel, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 89, 95 (2001) (arguing in-home care work is the most invisible of all 
underground economies); Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and 
Private Labeling Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International 
Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 111, 152-
53 (1998) (labeling domestic services and sex trade as part of an “invisible 
economy”). 
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because the number of migrants is increasing, having more than 
doubled since 1960.12
Migration is a particularly important issue for the fulfillment of 
women’s human rights for two reasons. First, an increasing number 
of labor migrants are female,13 prompting many advocates and 
scholars to refer to the “feminization of migration.”14 Second, 
women migrant workers are especially vulnerable to discrimination 
and exploitation that interferes with their enjoyment of many human 
rights, as illustrated by the stories above.15 Women migrant workers 
face discrimination both as women and as non-nationals of the 
country in which they work.16
International law specifically addresses the rights afforded to 
migrant workers through one of the seven core human rights treaties: 
the Migrant Workers’ Convention (“MWC”).17 Because of the low 
number of State Parties to the MWC, however, this convention has 
 12. See Total Migrant Stock, supra note 6, at 1. 
 13. See id. at 3 (noting that by 2005, female migrants constituted almost 50% 
of all migrants globally, and in developed countries, female migrants outnumbered 
males). 
 14. See LIN LEAN LIM ET AL., INT’L LABOUR ORG., PREVENTING 
DISCRIMINATION, EXPLOITATION, AND ABUSE OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN 
INFORMATION GUIDE, BOOKLET 1 - INTRODUCTION: WHY THE FOCUS ON WOMEN 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT WORKERS 2 (2003), http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/employment/gems/download/mbook1.pdf (explaining that feminization of 
migration is characterized by an overrepresentation of women migrants in 
vulnerable positions). The feminization of migration refers not only to the 
increasing number of female migrants, but also to the gendered nature of their 
work. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 9, at 61 (arguing that the gendered 
nature of the international labor market channels even well-educated women 
migrants into domestic service, regardless of their qualifications). 
 15. See LIM, supra note 14, at 15 (highlighting that women are more vulnerable 
as women compared to men, “as foreigners compared to nationals, as dependant as 
compared to autonomous migrants, and often as irregular [as opposed] to 
documented migrants”); see also NICOLA PIPER, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, GENDER AND MIGRATION 27 (2005), 
http://migrantcare.hug-ge.ch/_library/pdf/femmes_TP10.pdf (arguing that abusive 
practices against male migrant workers are more visible since they tend to work in 
union-represented sectors such as construction and agriculture, while abuses 
against unskilled women migrant workers typically occur in a more invisible 
situation, the unregulated work environments). 
 16. See LIM, supra note 14, at 2-3 (discussing the intersection between gender 
discrimination and discrimination of migrants because they are foreigners and 
noting that such multi-leveled discrimination places women in an even greater 
state of vulnerability). 
 17. See Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 7. 
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little impact in obliging States to provide a minimum core of rights 
for migrant workers within their boundaries.18 Professor Margaret 
Satterthwaite has argued that the rights of women migrant workers 
are included in the standards set out by the entire range of existing 
human rights treaties, and not simply in the Migrant Workers’ 
Convention.19 Building on Satterthwaite’s argument, I will examine 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (“CEDAW” or “the Convention”), and explore how it 
obligates State Parties to respect, protect, and fulfill women migrant 
workers’ human rights.20 I argue that the substantive equality 
guarantee of CEDAW, combined with the obligation of the state to 
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination by “any 
person, organization, or enterprise,”21 renders the Convention a 
powerful tool to hold both sending and receiving states accountable 
for violations of women migrant workers’ human rights. Given both 
the large number of states that have ratified CEDAW22 as well as the 
 18. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
 19. See generally Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Crossing Borders, Claiming 
Rights: Using Human Rights Law to Empower Women Migrant Workers, 8 YALE 
H.R. & DEV. L.J. 1, 1-24 (2005) (arguing that by using intersectionality, advocates 
for the rights of migrant workers can invoke other human rights treaties, and then 
articulating a treaty by treaty argument for how each treaty can be applied to 
migrant women). 
 20. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. See also 
Margaret Satterthwaite, Beyond Nannygate: Using Human Rights Law to Empower 
Migrant Domestic Workers in the Inter-American System 17 (Ctr. for Human 
Rights & Global Justice Econ. & Soc. Rights Series, Working Paper No. 8, 2006) 
(discussing the “respect, protect, fulfill” framework for viewing states’ roles in 
protecting individual rights). 
 21. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 2(e). 
 22. See id. As of April 2009, CEDAW has 185 States as parties. See United 
Nations, Status of CEDAW, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? 
src=TREATY&id=326&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). Although 
the United States is one of the few United Nations member states that has not 
ratified CEDAW, the legal situation of migrant worker rights in the United States 
has been frequently addressed in the literature. See, e.g., Connie de la Vega & 
Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use Applicable International 
Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented Migrant Workers’ Rights in the 
United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED 
PERSONS AND MIGRANT WORKERS 536-49 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2006) (arguing 
that advocates should use international standards contained in customary 
international law, the ICCPR, ICESCR, ILO Conventions, and other international 
law documents to address violations of undocumented migrant workers’ rights in 
the United States). Because the significant rights violations that occur in states 
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Convention’s Optional Protocol mechanism,23 CEDAW provides one 
of the most useful tools for holding States accountable for violations 
of the human rights of migrant workers within their territories. 
Furthermore, CEDAW’s guarantee of substantive equality is 
particularly valuable for women migrant workers claiming rights.24
This Article contributes to the literature in two primary ways. 
First, although it is frequently assumed that CEDAW embodies a 
substantive model of equality,25 scholars and activists alike have yet 
to show why this is the case. This paper aims to fill that gap by 
arguing that CEDAW embodies a principle of substantive equality. 
Second, the human rights of undocumented migrant workers have 
also been under-theorized in the existing literature, despite the vast 
number of migrant workers who fall into this category.26 Continuing 
within the framework of CEDAW, I connect the Convention to a
located in Asia and the Middle East have been less thoroughly addressed, I have 
chosen to focus on a useful tool for improving the fulfillment of women migrant 
worker human rights in these states. My argument is also applicable for all State 
Parties to CEDAW, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and the Philippines. 
 23. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4,U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. (providing a 
mechanism for the CEDAW Committee to hold State Parties accountable for 
human rights violations that moves beyond the reporting process and general 
comments). The Protocol contains a communications mechanism that allows 
individuals or groups of individuals under the jurisdiction of a State party to bring 
complaints to the CEDAW Committee alleging a violation of any of the rights set 
forth in the Convention. See id. art. 2. The Protocol also contains an inquiry 
procedure whereby the Committee is empowered to initiate an inquiry into “grave 
or systematic violations by a State of rights set forth in the Convention,” after 
receiving reliable information of such violations. Id. art. 8. 
 24. See infra Part II-C. 
 25. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women: 
Definitions, Paradigms, and Contexts, 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 65, 99 n.102 (1998) 
(defining undocumented migrant workers as those “who have arrived in the state of 
employment or residence without authorization, who are employed there without 
permission, or who entered with permission and have remained after the expiration 
of their visas,” and hypothesizing that the Migrant Workers Convention’s broad 
commitment to state sovereignty over immigration controls undermines or 
potentially defeats the human rights protections granted to some migrants (quoting 
Linda S. Bosniak, Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of 
Undocumented Migrants, 25 Int’l Migration Rev. 737, 742 (1991))). 
2009] A RIGHTS BASED APPROACH 849 
 
rights framework developed by the Inter-American Court in order to 
advance the development of a theory of undocumented worker rights. 
In Part I, I discuss abuses and human rights violations frequently 
experienced by women migrant workers. In Part II, I examine how 
CEDAW can be used to advocate for the rights of women migrant 
workers, focusing on substantive equality and state obligations under 
the Convention. Finally, in Part III, I explore the contribution of 
CEDAW to the rights of undocumented migrant workers. 
I. VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
MIGRANT WORKERS 
Women migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to a number 
of abuses in both the sending and receiving state.27 The abuse and 
exploitation of women involved in the maid trade implicates several 
sets of international norms, including: “the right to physical integrity; 
the right to the equal protection of the law and to fair legal process; 
freedom of movement and protection against forced labor; and 
protection of labor rights such as collective bargaining, fair wages, 
decent conditions of work and security of earnings.”28 Because 
violations of migrant worker human rights have been well 
documented,29 a brief overview will suffice. 
Abuses in the sending state typically arise in the context of 
securing employment. Women are often taken advantage of by 
recruitment agencies, particularly illegal ones.30 Recruitment 
 27. See LIM, supra note 14, at 22 (summarizing the abuses and vulnerabilities 
women migrant workers face at different stages of the migration process). 
 28. Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 9, at 85 (articulating the international 
norms implicated by the abuse and exploitation of women, and suggesting that 
women are particularly vulnerable because of the combined alienation they face as 
a result of their foreign status, race, and gender). 
 29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 30. See LIM, supra note 14, at 19 (documenting the dangers women face in the 
recruitment stage of illegal migration, including excessive fees to traffickers, being 
detained in “training camps,” and being targeted for deceptive practices by 
traffickers); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights., 
Report of the Special Rapporteur: Specific Groups and Individuals: Migrant 
Workers, ¶ 39 , U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/76 (Jan. 12, 2004) (prepared by Gabriela 
Rodríguez Pizarro) [hereinafter Migrant Workers] (documenting actions taken by 
illegal agencies, including abuse of female migrants, bribery of immigration 
officials, and the charging of excessive recruitment expenses). Women migrant 
workers are more likely to use illegal recruitment centers due to a limited access to 
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agencies typically charge exorbitant fees; many migrant workers “go 
into long-term debt or sell property to pay these fees.”31 Labor 
contracts are concluded between the employer and the recruitment 
agency, with the woman migrant worker lacking any input.32 Often, 
recruitment agencies mislead migrant workers about their placements 
by providing false information about the terms of employment.33
In receiving states, human rights abuses typically occur at the 
hands of both state law and private employers. At the governmental 
level, most states do not count domestic workers as “employees” 
under their labor codes.34 Thus, even if a state’s labor code has 
information, lack of time to search for legal channels, and lack of money to pay the 
fees. See LIM, supra note 14, at 19. 
 31. See LIM, supra note 14, at 19 (discussing the fees illegal agencies are able 
to charge, and why migrant women often face little choice except to borrow money 
to pay them); Migrant Workers, supra note 30, at ¶ 37 (discussing the heavy 
burden debt places on migrant workers, and the role that debt plays once the 
migrant reaches the receiving country). 
 32. Cf. BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 20-21 (describing situations in Saudi 
Arabia where officials confiscate contracts signed in the sending country, and force 
migrants to sign new Arabic language contracts, whose contents are unknown); 
Migrant Workers, supra note 30, at ¶ 52 (concluding that by signing contracts that 
they do not understand, migrant workers often end up in detrimental and dangerous 
situations). 
 33. See Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 9, at 73 (explaining that broker 
middlemen often make false or misleading claims about placements). See, e.g., 
HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 27; SWEPT UNDER THE RUG, supra note 10, at 69. 
Migrant workers are also misled about their wages. BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 
21. 
 34. See, e.g., Employment Act §§ 2, 36, 38, 89 (Cap. 91, 1996 Rev. Ed.) 
(Sing.), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl? 
actno=REVED-91 (defining workman under Singapore law to specifically exclude 
domestic workers, exempting such workers from protections including a minimum 
of one rest day per week, fourteen days of paid sick leave, and a maximum on 
weekly hours); Labour Law No. 8, 1996, art. 3 (Jor.), available at http:// 
www.nabeelaw.com/documents.labour.ch1_3_en/main.html (excluding domestic 
servants, gardeners, cooks, and all agricultural employees from various labor 
protections under Jordanian law); Malaysia Employment Act 1955 § 12 and First 
Schedule (excluding domestic servants in Malaysia from protections of rest days, 
hours of work, and holidays); BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 27 (noting that 
Article 3(a) of Saudi Arabia’s 1969 labor law also provides that its provisions 
“shall not apply” to “domestic servants and persons regarded as such”); see also 
LIN LEAN LIM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, PREVENTING 
DISCRIMINATION, EXPLOITATION, AND ABUSE OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN 
INFORMATION GUIDE—BOOKLET 4: WORKING AND LIVING ABROAD 12 (2003), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/download/mbook4.pdf 
(listing other states that exclude domestic workers from their labor legislation). But 
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protections for workers such as overtime pay, minimum wage, and 
regulation of hours, women migrants often work in domestic service 
jobs that are not covered by these regulations.35 Domestic workers 
are also frequently exempted from health insurance, social security, 
unemployment programs, and other government services.36
In addition to inadequate regulation concerning domestic work and 
other jobs typically performed by migrant workers, there is often 
very little domestic governmental monitoring of the worksite.37 This 
lack of monitoring permits private employers to violate the rights of 
migrant workers. Employers frequently fail to pay the migrant 
worker on time or according to the contract terms.38 In addition, they 
often withhold pay for long periods of time, or will only pay the 
migrant worker reduced wages.39 Even when the employers abide by 
see, e.g., Government Gazette 23732, GN 1068, 15 Aug. 2002 (S. Afr.), available 
at http://www.labour.gov.za/downloads/legislation/sectoral-determinations/basic-
conditions-of-employment/Sectoral%20Determination%207%20-%20Domestic%2 
0Workers.pdf (demonstrating that, under Sectoral Determination 7: Domestic 
Worker Sector, South Africa presents a notable exception, where domestic 
workers, gardeners, caretakers in private homes, and chauffeurs are all protected 
by labor legislation that mandates a minimum wage, an annual wage increase, a 
maximum number of 45 hours per week, overtime pay, and rest breaks during the 
day). 
 35. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
CONFERENCE, 87TH SESSION, MIGRANT WORKERS 105–06 (1999) (describing 
women migrant workers as particularly vulnerable in part due to fact that they 
often hold jobs for which there is little protection under social legislation). 
 36. See, e.g., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, NO. 13-11802, OFFICE OF 
POLICY, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD: ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC, 2004, at 45, 68, 130, 149, 163 (2005), available at http://digital 
commons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/168 (noting that Bahrain, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia exclude domestic workers from their social 
insurance programs). In Malaysia, voluntary coverage exists for domestic servants 
and foreign workers in the provident fund, covering old age, disability, and 
survivor benefits. Id. at 130. Brunei, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, and Syria 
exclude domestic workers from workmen’s compensation funds. Id. at 52, 133, 
140, 169, 176. 
 37. HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 37. 
 38. See MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 48–52 (discussing and providing 
examples of employers withholding wages from migrant workers in Singapore); 
BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 38-41 (describing how some employers in Saudi 
Arabia withhold salaries and/or do not fully pay their migrant workers, and 
explaining how women workers are particularly vulnerable to this type of abuse). 
 39. See HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 42 (interviewing fifty-one domestic 
workers in Malaysia and finding that twenty-six did not receive their full salary, 
twelve received no salary, and many others were still working and hoping they 
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the migrant workers’ contracts, the contract terms typically include 
substandard wages, long hours, and little or no time off.40
Women migrant workers in the domestic sector are especially 
vulnerable to restrictions on their freedom of movement.41 Some 
states have taxes on employers to ensure that the migrant worker 
does not “run away.”42 Thus, employers often have an incentive to 
keep the migrant worker locked in the house. Employers commonly 
confiscate travel documents,43 and forbid women to leave the house 
alone, or have any contact with the outside world.44 Migrant 
domestic workers are isolated from others.45 Because of their close 
proximity to and dependence on their employers, women migrant 
workers are often vulnerable to gender-based violence in the 
workplace, which often goes unreported.46 In at least one study, 
nearly half of all foreign domestic workers interviewed reported 
physical, psychological, or sexual abuse.47 In some states a migrant 
worker can be fined for leaving abusive employment situations, 
would be paid at the end of their two-year contracts). 
 40. See MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 38–40 (discussing the dangers, both 
financial and physical, that face migrant workers who labor under unfair 
employment contracts); Migrant Workers, supra note 30, at ¶ 31 (discussing 
working conditions and hours that amount to slave labor). 
 41. See HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 40–42 (describing typical restrictions 
on migrant workers’ freedom of movement, including rules against going outside, 
the practice of locking workers inside employers’ homes, and the utilization of 
surveillance systems and alarms); MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 42–48 
(discussing the practice of forced confinement in Singapore). 
 42. See MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 4 (noting, for example, that 
employers in Singapore forfeit S$5000 to the government if their domestic worker 
runs away). 
 43. See Migrant Workers, supra note 30, at ¶ 34; SWEPT UNDER THE RUG, 
supra note 10, at 77 (documenting the “routine” practice of employers in 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia to confiscate passports and work permits, 
thereby ensuring that any employees that escape face the risk of being caught by 
government officials, arrested and deported). 
 44. MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 42–46; SWEPT UNDER THE RUG, supra 
note 10, at 73–76. 
 45. See BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 47 (describing forced confinement and 
isolation as “gender-specific abuse”). 
 46. See HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 48–50 (discussing sexual abuse and 
harassment at the hands of employers); BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 57 
(discussing women migrant workers’ vulnerability to sexual abuse, rape, and the 
possibility of contracting HIV/AIDS); MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 75–78, 
82–84 (discussing both physical and sexual abuse of domestic workers by 
employers in Singapore). 
 47. HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 46. 
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because she is no longer in the country legally once she has stopped 
working.48
Despite the prevalence of human rights abuses, both domestic law 
and international law typically fail to help migrant workers. In the 
domestic context, most sending states do very little to assist migrant 
workers before their departure or while they are living abroad, and 
rarely provide information to educate migrants about what to expect 
if they migrate.49 States fail to monitor and close down illegal 
recruitment agencies, or to regulate legal recruitment agencies.50 
States are even less likely to monitor private employers.51
For their part, many receiving states fail to recognize legal rights 
for migrant workers. As previously mentioned, many receiving states 
exclude migrant workers from their labor codes and other benefits.52 
A lack of effective enforcement mechanisms leaves governments 
with little capacity to manage migration, particularly by monitoring 
 48. Id. at 66; SWEPT UNDER THE RUG, supra note 10, at 76; see also Fitzpatrick 
& Kelly, supra note 9, at 77-78 (discussing Filipina household workers in Hong 
Kong who must leave within two weeks of termination of their employment 
contracts). 
 49. See HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 27-29 (discussing a general lack of 
information among migrant women); cf. LIN LEAN LIM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, EXPLOITATION, AND 
ABUSE OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN INFORMATION GUIDE—BOOKLET 2: 
DECISION-MAKING AND PREPARING FOR EMPLOYMENT ABROAD 16 (2003), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/download/mbook2.pdf 
(noting the unrealistic perceptions and expectations about working abroad that 
migrant workers often hold). 
 50. See HELP WANTED, supra note 2, at 21–22 (describing how the Ministry of 
Manpower in Singapore fails to rigorously monitor labor suppliers); Migrant 
Workers, supra note 30, at Executive Summary (discussing the lack of watchdog 
mechanisms and inadequate government monitoring); SWEPT UNDER THE RUG, 
supra note 10, at 69 (arguing that inadequate regulation and government oversight 
give employment agencies “enormous influence over the fates of migrant domestic 
workers”); MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 102 (claiming that sending states 
typically do not have systems in place to monitor employment agencies). 
 51. See, e.g., BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining that government 
authorities tolerate private employers who subject women to forced confinement); 
see also MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 70 (arguing that inadequate state 
regulation of domestic workers’ wages has led to disproportionately low wages as 
compared to other types of labor, as well as discriminatory practices by agencies 
who determine wages according to nationality); see also SWEPT UNDER THE RUG, 
supra note 10, at 34 (claiming that “inadequate monitoring creat[es] an 
environment of impunity for employers”). 
 52. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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illegal recruiters and employers who violate migrant workers’ rights. 
Many receiving states do not let migrants form unions, leaving them 
unable to effectively organize and demand that employers respect 
their human rights.53 These receiving states also do little to 
encourage migrant women to report violations of their rights, and 
often erect barriers to access to the judiciary or other competent 
tribunals.54  
The international framework for migrant workers fares little better. 
In 1990 the UN General Assembly adopted the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (“Migrant Workers’ Convention” or 
“MWC”), encompassing a wide variety of protections.55 The MWC, 
 53. See VITIT MUNTARBHORN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, THE 
MEKONG CHALLENGE: EMPLOYMENT AND PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN 
THAILAND: NATIONAL LAWS/PRACTICE VERSUS INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
STANDARDS 16 (2005) (noting that Thailand prohibits foreign workers from 
forming or organizing unions, and while there is no prohibition on foreign workers 
joining unions, irregular migrants are unlikely to be accepted as members); Human 
Rights Watch, Building Towers, Cheating Workers: Exploitation of Migrant 
Workers in the United Arab Emirates, 18 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1, 7 (2006) 
[hereinafter Cheating Workers] (discussing the United Arab Emirates’ prohibition 
on foreign workers organizing unions, but noting that this ban may be changing); 
see also BAD DREAMS, supra note 4, at 69-70 (pointing out that Saudi Arabia 
prohibits all workers, the majority of whom are migrants, from striking or 
organizing trade unions); Satterthwaite, supra note 19, at n.259 (citing an ILO 
report which states “that ‘only two countries in Asia (Hong Kong and Japan) have 
legally registered independent migrant trade unions’”). 
 54. See Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 9, at 76-77 (describing formal barriers 
that impede access to legal protection for migrant victims of sexual assault, and 
noting that prosecutions of employers who commit crimes against migrant 
household workers are “extremely rare”); see also LIM, supra note 34, at 11 
(explaining women migrant workers usually do not have access to labor courts). 
Barriers to access to a competent tribunal can also be economic. For example, 
although Hong Kong has established a tribunal to adjudicate contractual disputes 
between migrant workers and their employers, the migrant workers must pay a 
significant cash fee to immigration authorities to extend their leave to remain in 
Hong Kong while the case is pending. See Fitzpatrick & Kelly, supra note 9, at 78. 
Malaysia similarly requires migrant workers to purchase a special pass visa, 
renewable monthly, in order to stay in the country after leaving work due to abuse 
or exploitative work conditions and filing a labor dispute. See TENAGANITA, 
MIGRANT WORKERS: ACCESS DENIED 26 (2004). 
 55. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 7. The MWC was the product of 
a decade-long drafting process in which all United Nations member states could 
contribute to the Working Group. See Rachel Li Wai Suen, You Sure Know How to 
Pick ‘Em: Human Rights and Migrant Farm Workers in Canada, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 199, 217 (2000). 
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which entered into force on July 1, 2003, contains clear non-
discrimination and equal protection standards, prohibiting States 
from discriminating based on alien status.56 Equal protection of the 
law is guaranteed to all migrant workers, whether documented or 
undocumented, male or female.57 The MWC contains numerous 
substantive rights, which must be granted to all migrant workers 
irrespective of their employment or residency status.58 The MWC 
grants additional substantive rights to documented migrant workers 
or migrant workers in a “regular situation.”59 Although in theory the 
MWC holds states accountable for fulfilling a vast number of human 
rights for migrant workers, in practice, only forty-one countries had 
ratified the treaty as of April 2009.60 Furthermore, none of the 
primary receiving states for migrant workers have ratified the 
MWC.61 Thus, despite the broad protections it offers, in practice the 
MWC is a weak and ineffective mechanism for claiming rights. 
 56. See Satterthwaite, supra note 19, at 22. 
 57. See id.; see also Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 7, arts. 18-19. 
 58. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 7, arts. 8-35. Substantive rights 
include, for example, the right to life, the right to be free from torture, and the right 
to be free from slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labor. Id. arts. 9-11. All 
migrants are guaranteed freedom of religion, as well as the right to liberty and 
security of person and property. Id. arts. 12, 16. Article 25 guarantees to all 
migrant workers, whether regular or irregular in status, “treatment not less 
favourable than that which applies to nationals of the State of employment,” with 
respect to remuneration, overtime, hours of work, vacation time, and other 
conditions and terms of employment. Id. art. 25. Migrant workers are also 
guaranteed social security on the same terms as nationals, along with the right to 
emergency medical care and access to education for their children. Id. art. 27. 
 59. See Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 7, art. 36–56. 
 60. See United Nations, Status of the Migrant Workers Convention, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=138&chapter=4&
lang=en (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 61. See Daniel A. Bell, Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign 
Domestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE 
BULWARKS OF LOCALISM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 291, 303 (Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & András Sajó eds., 2005); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, International 
Decisions: Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Workers. Advisory Opinion 
OC-18/03, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 462 n.23 (2005); Ratna Kapur, Travel Plans: 
Border Crossings and the Rights of Transnational Migrants, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 107, 121 (2005) (noting that the treaty has yet to be ratified by a state in the 
“global North”). By contrast, many receiving states that have not ratified the 
Migrant Workers Convention—such as Singapore, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and 
Lebanon, to give a few examples—have ratified CEDAW. Compare Status of the 
Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 60, with Status of CEDAW, supra note 
22. 
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Yet as Satterthwaite explains, the other core human rights treaties 
provide a strong basis for advocating for migrant workers’ human 
rights.62 In the next section I explore why CEDAW is a particularly 
compelling tool to advocate for the fulfillment of the human rights of 
migrant workers. 
II. APPLYING CEDAW TO WOMEN MIGRANT 
WORKERS 
A. CEDAW OVERVIEW 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted CEDAW on 
December 19, 1979.63 The Convention’s preamble expresses concern 
for extensive discrimination against women that continued to exist, 
despite a number of instruments (including the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)) that were intended to 
provide for equal rights for men and women.64
CEDAW contains a broad definition of discrimination against 
women,65 and describes a number of measures that States must 
 62. See Satterthwaite, supra note 19, at 4–5 (arguing that the rights of women 
migrant workers are included in standards set out by other human rights treaties). 
See generally OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
FACT SHEET NO. 30, THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/OHCHR-FactSheet30.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2009) (providing a background on these core human rights treaties, 
specifically the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR), the Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)). 
 63. CEDAW, supra note 20; INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTION 
WATCH ASIA PACIFIC, OUR RIGHTS ARE NOT OPTIONAL: ADVOCATING FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW) THROUGH ITS OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 
2 (2005) [hereinafter OUR RIGHTS ARE NOT OPTIONAL]. 
 64. See CEDAW, supra note 20, pmbl. 
 65. See id. art. 1 (“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 
‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”). 
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undertake to eliminate this discrimination.66 Further evidencing the 
Convention’s goal of advancing the treatment of women around the 
world, CEDAW permits—and even encourages—States to adopt 
temporary special measures that treat men and women differently in 
order to accelerate the achievement of equality between men and 
women.67
Articles 7 through 16 contain substantive provisions relating to 
certain areas such as participation in politics and public life at both 
national and international levels, changing or retaining nationality, 
education, employment, health care, economic and social life, rural 
women, and family relations.68 In each area, the State agrees to 
undertake measures to eliminate discrimination against women, and 
ensure the fulfillment of certain human rights on an equal basis with 
men.69
Part V of the Convention establishes the CEDAW Committee 
(“the Committee”), which is comprised of twenty-three experts 
selected by State Parties according to various rules.70 The Committee 
is allowed to make its own rules of procedure,71 and considers 
reports made by State Parties “on the legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give 
effect to the provisions of the present Convention and on the 
progress made in this respect.”72 The Committee is empowered to 
make general recommendations and suggestions after examining the 
State Party reports.73 In practice, the Committee issues Concluding 
Comments to reporting State Parties, providing each State with 
specific recommendations that should be undertaken or begun in the 
time period before the next report.74 The Committee has also issued 
 66. Id. art. 2. 
 67. Id. art. 4; see also infra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the 
CEDAW Committee General Recommendation on temporary special measures). 
 68. CEDAW, supra note 20, arts. 7-16. 
 69. Id. art. 3. 
 70. Id. art. 17. 
 71. Id. art. 19. 
 72. Id. art. 18. 
 73. Id. art. 21. 
 74. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women: Cape Verde, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CPV/CO/6 (Aug. 25, 2006) 
[hereinafter Cape Verde]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of 
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twenty-six General Recommendations, the latest one produced in 
2009.75 After a number of short recommendations, often on 
procedural issues such as reporting guidelines,76 or reservations to 
the Convention,77 the Committee decided in 1991 to put forth more 
detailed and comprehensive recommendations based on specific 
provisions of the Convention, and “cross-cutting themes” such as 
domestic violence or women’s health.78
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF CEDAW TO MIGRANT WORKERS 
Because CEDAW is one of the most widely ratified international 
human rights treaties,79 it has the potential to be a potent tool for 
Discrimination Against Women: Chile, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (Aug. 25, 
2006) [hereinafter Chile]; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women: Cambodia, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/KHM/CO/3 
(Jan. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Cambodia]; Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments: Italy, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/ITA/CC/4-5 (Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Italy]. 
 75. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendations, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/comments.htm 
(last visited April 27, 2009). 
 76. See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Fifth Session, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/41/45 (1986) 
[hereinafter Fifth Committee Report], see also U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Sixth Session,  
¶ 577, U.N. Doc. A/42/38 (1987) [hereinafter Sizth Committee Report]. 
 77. See Sixth Committee Report, supra note 76, at ¶ 576. 
 78. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
supra note 75. 
 79. See Status of CEDAW, supra note 22 (noting that as of March 2009, 
CEDAW has 185 State Parties, which constitutes over 90% of United Nations’ 
members). By contrast, as of September 2008, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) had 162 State Parties, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) had 159 State Parties, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) had 173 State Parties, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) had 145 State Parties, and 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (MWC) had 37 State Parties. See Status 
of CEDAW, supra note 22. Of the seven core human rights treaties, only the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), with 193 State Parties, has more 
parties than CEDAW. See United Nations, Status of CRC, http://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=133&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
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empowering female domestic migrant workers. Although the 
Convention does not specifically mention migrant workers, the text 
of CEDAW supports an argument in favor of the treaty’s broad 
applicability. In addition to the broad discrimination definition of 
Article 1,80 Article 2 condemns discrimination against women “in all 
forms,”81 and Article 3 obliges States to take appropriate measures 
“in all fields” to guarantee that women enjoy their human rights.82 
Furthermore, in contrast to several other human rights treaties, 
CEDAW does not explicitly distinguish between the rights of 
citizens and non-citizens.83
For its part, the CEDAW Committee reads the Convention as 
encompassing more than its text.84 For example, although violence 
against women is not explicitly mentioned in the text of CEDAW, 
the Committee has determined that gender-based violence is 
“discrimination” within the meaning of Article 1 of CEDAW, thus 
obliging State Parties to take measures to combat violence against 
Apr. 27, 2009). 
 80. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 1. 
 81. Id. art. 2. 
 82. Id. art. 3. 
 83. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, 
Dec. 16 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Civil Rights Convention] (granting 
several rights specifically to citizens, including the right to vote and participate in 
public affairs). Other articles of the convention refer to rights for “everyone” or 
provide for measures that shall happen to “no one.” See, e.g., id. arts. 7, 8, 9, 12. 
By contrast, CEDAW refers only to the rights of “women.” See generally 
CEDAW, supra note 20. The Migrant Worker’s Convention distinguishes between 
the human rights of all migrant workers and the human rights of migrant workers 
in a documented or regular situation. Compare Migrant Workers Convention, 
supra note 7, arts. 8-35, with id. arts. 36-56. The ICESCR permits developing 
countries to limit the economic rights of non-nationals. See International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Cultural Rights Covenant]. CERD does not prohibit a State from 
making distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences between citizens and 
non-citizens. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination art. 1, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 84. See International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004) [hereinafter 
Compilation of Comments] (“The Convention is a dynamic instrument. Since the 
adoption of the Convention in 1979, the Committee, as well as other actors at the 
national and international levels, have contributed through progressive thinking to 
the clarification and understanding of the substantive content of the Convention’s 
articles and the specific nature of discrimination against women and the 
instruments for combating such discrimination.”). 
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women.85 Although the Committee’s general recommendations are 
not legally binding,86 State Parties are expected to implement general 
recommendations in order to fulfill their obligations under the 
Convention.87 The Committee recently formulated a general 
recommendation on women migrant workers.88
Though the General Recommendation on women migrant workers 
is new, the CEDAW Committee has consistently recognized the 
applicability of the Convention to women migrant workers.89 In its 
concluding comments and recommendations to State Parties that 
have submitted reports, the Committee has frequently expressed 
concern for their rights.90 Additionally, in its general 
 85. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CEDAW General 
Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (Jan. 29, 
1992) [hereinafter Recommendation 19] (highlighting specific articles of the 
Convention that are relevant to violence against women and then making specific 
recommendations for States). 
 86. See High Commissioner for Human Rights, Discrimination Against 
Women, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs22.htm; see also Charles J. 
Ogletree Jr. & Rangita de Silva-de Alwis, The Recently Revived Marriage Law of 
China: the Promise and Reality, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 251, 303 (2004) (stating 
that General Recommendation 19 is “authoritative jurisprudential interpretation” of 
CEDAW but is not binding on state parties). 
 87. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Bodies, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/leafletontreatybodies.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) 
(explaining that a State party is expected to implement the recommendations of 
treaty bodies). 
 88. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Women Migrant 
Workers]. 
 89. See United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, United Nations Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Fifteenth 
Session, ¶ 186, U.N. Doc. A/51/38 (1996) [hereinafter Fifteenth Session] (noting 
with regard to Belgium, for example, that “[i]nterest and concern were expressed 
by the Committee as regards efforts to address the needs of minority groups such 
as migrant women”). 
 90. See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Cyprus, ¶ 30, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/5 (May 30, 2006) [hereinafter Cyprus] (“The 
Committee calls on the State party to monitor closely the terms and conditions of 
contracts, conditions of work and salaries of women migrants and devise strategies 
and policies for their full integration in the labour force and for elimination of 
direct and indirect discrimination.”); see Cambodia, supra note 74, at ¶ 22 (“The 
Committee calls on the State party to focus on the causes of women’s migration 
and to develop policies and measures to protect migrant women against 
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recommendation on women and health, the Committee noted that 
“special attention should be given to the health needs and rights of” 
migrant women and other especially vulnerable groups.91 Thus, the 
Convention’s applicability to women migrant workers is clear.92
I turn next to the principal reasons why CEDAW is particularly 
helpful to women migrant workers: the Convention’s guarantee of 
substantive equality and the obligation it imposes on States to 
eliminate discrimination by non-State actors within its jurisdiction. 
Although the Committee and others have assumed that CEDAW 
provides for substantive equality, the legal argument for this 
proposition is typically overlooked.93 Thus, I attempt to put forth 
support for this proposition through a textual analysis94 of the 
Convention. 
 
exploitation and abuse.”); see also United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Australia, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUL/CO/5 (Feb. 3, 2006) [hereinafter 
Australia] (“The Committee urges the State party to take more effective measures 
to eliminate discrimination against refugee, migrant and minority women and 
girls.”); United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments: Ireland, ¶ 37, U.N. 
Doc. CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/4-5 (July 22, 2005) [hereinafter Ireland] (“The 
Committee calls on the State party to ensure that women domestic workers, 
including migrant women, are duly protected against discrimination.”). 
 91. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CEDAW General 
Recommendation 24: Women and Health, ¶ 6, Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (Feb. 2, 1999) 
[hereinafter Recommendation 24]. 
 92. See Women Migrant Workers, supra note 88, ¶ 2 (“[T]he Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women protects all women, 
including migrant women, against sex- and gender-based discrimination.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes et al., State Obligations and the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 115 (Univ. of New South Wales 
Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 48, 2007) (advocating for a 
General Recommendation on CEDAW Article II stating, among other principles, 
that CEDAW embodies the concept of substantive equality); OUR RIGHTS ARE 
NOT OPTIONAL, supra note 63, at 4 (describing CEDAW as promoting a model of 
substantive equality). 
 94. Textual analysis is a legitimate (and often preferred) approach to the 
interpretation of treaties. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 
31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”). 
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C. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
i. Substantive Equality in Practice 
Substantive equality moves beyond a notion of formal, or de jure, 
equality—the idea that the law must treat men and women equally.95 
Instead, the concept of substantive equality has been defined as 
“directed at eliminating individual, institutional and systemic 
discrimination against disadvantaged groups which effectively 
undermines their full and equal social, economic, political, and 
cultural participation in society.”96 Thus, treating people equally 
from a substantive equality point of view does not necessarily mean 
treating them identically. Because of discrimination that a group 
(such as women) has historically faced, along with existing 
discriminatory attitudes, a law that facially puts men and women 
alike does not necessarily treat them equally, under the substantive 
equality model. 
To illustrate by way of example, consider the United States’ 
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which grants up to 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave within a twelve-month period for 
reasons such as the birth of a child, a serious health condition, or to 
care for a dependent.97 This gender-neutral statute applies to all 
“eligible employees,” defined by the amount of time a person has 
been employed for an employer of a certain size.98 Thus, under the 
FMLA, men and women have an equal statutory right to unpaid 
leave. This formal equality, however, may not be enough to achieve 
substantive equality of women in the workplace. As some scholars 
have argued: 
To expect women to accommodate their childbearing needs 
to policies dealing with sickness is to impose a male norm on 
women—they may participate in the workplace as long as 
they are like men. Women require special treatment—an
 95. See Renu Mandhane, The Use of Human Rights Discourse to Secure 
Women’s Interests: Critical Analysis of the Implications, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
275, 302 n.184 (2004). 
 96. RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES: FEMINIST 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA 176 (1996). 
 97. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1993). 
 98. Id. § 2611 (defining “eligible employees” as those who have worked for an 
employer for twelve months, or 1,250 hours during a twelve month period). 
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acknowledgment that they bear children while male workers 
do not—to put them on an equal footing in the workplace.99
Acknowledging that women are situated differently from men, due 
to both biology and societal attitudes towards child-rearing, a 
substantive view of equality might demand additional pregnancy 
leave for women on top of the twelve weeks of leave granted by the 
FMLA (leave that could still be taken for other serious health 
conditions and to care for dependents). Although men and women 
are not formally treated equally under this proposal, it would help 
women achieve true equality in the workplace by helping them 
achieve equal opportunity to participate in the labor market.100
Certain national courts have recognized substantive equality in 
their jurisprudence,101 and decisions of these courts have helped 
develop and define the concept.102 For example, the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms—which contains a textually less 
 99. See Sally J. Kenney, Pregnancy Discrimination: Toward Substantive 
Equality, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 351, 362 (1995). 
 100. See, e.g., Scott A. Caplan-Cotenoff, Note, Parental Leave: The Need for a 
National Policy to Foster Sexual Equality, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 71, 86-88 (1987) 
(describing the feminist debate over whether equality for women is best achieved 
by equal treatment or special accommodations); Kenney, supra note 99, at 362; 
Susan A. Kidwell, Note, Pregnancy Discrimination in Educational Institutions: A 
Proposal to Amend the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 
1312-13 (2001); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Law Left Out Low-Income 
Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 40 (2007) (describing the debate 
between equality feminists and proponents of a statute guaranteeing women 
pregnancy leave). 
 101. In addition to Canada and South Africa, whose domestic courts have 
explored substantive equality in the most detail, substantive equality has also been 
recognized in India. See Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 
206, 220 (India) (recognizing substantive equality in India by stating that “[t]he 
equality clause in the Constitution does not speak of mere formal equality before 
the law but embodies the concept of real and substantive equality which strikes at 
inequalities arising on account of vast social and economic differentials and is 
consequently an essential ingredient of social and economic justice”). 
 102. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice 
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), at ¶¶ 60-64 (S. Afr.) (demonstrating that the concept 
of substantive equality has been developed not only with respect to women, but 
also with respect to other historically discriminated-against groups). For example, 
the South African Constitutional Court acknowledged the contemplation of 
substantive equality in that country’s Constitution in a case holding that the 
criminalization of sodomy in private between consenting males severely limited 
the right to equality for gay men and lesbians. Id. 
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expansive guarantee of equality than does CEDAW103—has been 
interpreted by the Canadian Supreme Court as containing a guarantee 
of substantive equality.104 The Canadian Supreme Court explained, 
“Section 15(1) guarantees more than formal equality; it guarantees 
that equality will be mainly concerned with ‘the impact of the law on 
the individual or the group concerned.’”105 The South African 
Constitutional Court reached a similar conclusion about its 
Constitution, declaring that “Section 9 of the constitution . . . clearly 
contemplates both substantive and remedial equality.”106
As the concept of substantive equality has developed, various 
definitions of the term have emerged,107 centered on the idea that 
 103. See Constitution Act, 1982 S.C., ch. 12 § 15 (Can.): 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age, or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object 
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those 
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age, or mental or physical disability. 
Id. It should be noted that the “discrimination based on … sex” language of §15 is 
similar to the “distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex” 
language of CEDAW, further supporting the argument that this language does not 
preclude a substantive equality interpretation of the Convention. See CEDAW, 
supra note 20, art. 1; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 94, art. 31(1) 
(providing guidance on how to interpret treaties). 
 104. See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 165 
(Can.). 
 105. See Symes v. The Queen, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 754 (quoting Andrews, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. at 165 (Can.)). 
 106. Nat’l Coal., 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at ¶ 62 (S. Afr.) (noting that the 
State had a constitutional obligation to implement measures to foster substantive 
equality). 
 107. See, e.g., Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual 
Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1271, 1294 n.94 (2006) 
(stating that “[w]hile formal equality emphasizes equal opportunity, substantive 
equality emphasizes equal outcomes”); Renu Mandhane, The Use of Human Rights 
Discourse to Secure Women’s Interests: Critical Analysis of the Implications, 10 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 302 n.184 (2004) (explaining that “[s]ubstantive 
equality . . . aims at achieving de facto equality such that women might be treated 
differently than men in order to ensure an equitable outcome”); Thomas Trelogan 
et al., Can’t We Enlarge the Blanket and the Bed? A Comparative Analysis of 
Positive/Affirmative Action in the European Court of Justice and the United States 
Supreme Court, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 39, 51 (2004) (claiming that 
“[i]n contrast to formal equality, a results-oriented or substantive equality focuses 
on the goal of equalizing burdens and benefits for women and men. Persons 
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substantive equality moves beyond formal equality to address the 
systemic roots of discrimination.108 Substantive equality demands 
that a state provide the institutional tools to create equal 
opportunities—tools that go beyond merely treating all persons alike 
under the law. As the South African Constitutional Court explained, 
“the creation of democracy and equal treatment before the law are 
not enough to foster substantive equality.”109 Similarly, the Canadian 
Supreme Court, in developing its conception of substantive equality 
as embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, noted that “it is 
clear that a law may be discriminatory even if it is not directly or 
expressly discriminatory.”110 This idea of “adverse effects 
discrimination”111 is captured by the “effect or purpose” language in 
CEDAW.112
A key element to achieving substantive equality is the idea that the 
state may—and should—take measures designed to advance persons 
previously or currently discriminated against. Thus, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa proclaimed, 
Substantive equality is envisaged when section 9(2) [of the 
Constitution] unequivocally asserts that equality includes ‘the 
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.’ The 
state is further obliged ‘to promote the achievement of such 
equality’ by ‘legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’, which envisages 
remedial equality.113
committed to substantive equality attempt distributions that are equal in their effect 
on the lives of women and men”). 
 108. See Nat’l Coal., 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at ¶ 60 (S. Afr.) (identifying 
circumstances in which substantive equality is preferable to formal equality). “Past 
unfair discrimination frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the 
continuation of which is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are 
eliminated, and unless remedied, may continue for a substantial time and even 
indefinitely.” Id. 
 109. See Minister of Finance v. Van Harden 2004 (11) BCLR 1125 (CC) at ¶ 73 
(S. Afr.) (opinion of Justice Mogkoro).
 110. Symes, 4 S.C.R. at 755 (Can.) . 
 111. Id. (detailing cases that enumerate the principle of adverse effects 
discrimination). 
 112. See infra notes 116, 118-21, 123 and accompanying text. 
 113. Nat’l Coal., 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at ¶ 62 (S. Afr.). 
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This obligation on the South African State is similar to that of 
State Parties to CEDAW under Article 4, the temporary special 
measures provision,114 in that both envision unequal treatment as 
potentially necessary to create equal opportunity. The temporary 
special measures provision helps provide the legal basis for 
CEDAW’s guarantee of substantive equality. I next set forth the full 
argument for why CEDAW demands that State Parties provide 
substantive, rather than formal, equality. 
ii. CEDAW Demands Substantive Equality 
The text of CEDAW moves beyond a commitment to formal 
equality for women. The discrimination definition encompassed in 
Article 1 includes distinctions, exclusions, or restrictions made on 
the basis of sex that have the “effect or purpose” of impairing 
women’s equality.115
One could argue that the language in CEDAW defining 
discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on 
the basis of sex” supports an interpretation that States are only 
obliged to take steps to ensure formal equality of the law.116 
 114. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 4 
Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de 
facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as 
defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontinued 
when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieve. 
Id., see also Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CEDAW 
General Recommendation 5: Temporary Special Measures, U.N. Doc. A/43/38 
(Apr. 3, 1988) [hereinafter Recommendation 5] (noting that changing 
discriminatory laws has not completely remedied inequality between men and 
women, and recommending that states make more use of temporary special 
measures). 
 115. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 1  
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ 
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field. 
Id. 
 116. See id. (emphasis added). But see Andrea D. Friedman, Using the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to 
Advocate for the Political Rights of Women in a Democratic Burma, 28 HARV. J. 
L. & GENDER 481, 483 (2005) (arguing that CEDAW parties “cannot just pay ‘lip 
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However, as I will explain, the text in other articles of the 
Convention supports a substantive equality interpretation, and this is 
in fact the interpretation the CEDAW Committee has adopted in 
practice. Furthermore, the terms of a treaty must be interpreted “in 
their context and in the light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”117 
The object and purpose of CEDAW is to eliminate discrimination 
against women “in all its forms and manifestations.”118 These words, 
and indeed the entire Preamble, indicate that the object and purpose 
of CEDAW is to eradicate more than presently existing formal 
discrimination. 
The “effect or purpose” language of Article 1 thus supports a 
substantive equality approach to rights. As Katharine Bartlett 
explains: 
[A] substantive equality approach looks to a rule’s results or 
effects. It points out that equal treatment leads to outcomes 
that are unequal because of differences between men and 
women. Advocates of substantive equality demand that rules 
take account of these differences in order to eliminate the 
disadvantages they bring to women.119
Thus, while a law may not facially discriminate against women, it 
may still be discriminatory in fact, and as a result, a State Party to 
CEDAW has a legal obligation to change the law. For example, a 
law permitting only property owners to vote, in a country that only 
recently gave women the right to own property, effectively 
discriminates against women.120 Although formally both men and 
service’ to gender equality”). See generally Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality Before the 
Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws Under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and 
Through the Beijing Platform for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 19 (2005) 
(focusing on how States’ reservations to CEDAW have impacted monitoring).
 117. See Vienna Convention, supra note 94, art. 31(1); see also id. art. 31(2) 
(including not only the text, but also the “preamble and annexes” within the 
context of treaties). 
 118. See CEDAW, supra note 20, pmbl. 
 119. Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4 
(1994) (discussing further the different models of substantive equality); see also 
Nat’l Coal., 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at ¶ 61 (making a similar point, albeit 
more succinctly, that “treating people identically can sometimes result in 
inequality”). 
 120. International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific contains a similar 
example in its training materials on non-discrimination. See INTERNATIONAL 
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women can vote under the law, most landowners, and thus voters, are 
likely to be male, given that women could only recently start 
accumulating land.121 Similarly, a tax that Singapore imposes on 
employers when a domestic servant runs away could be found to 
have an adverse effect on women, who make up a disproportionate 
share of the domestic servants finding themselves in situations of 
forced confinement due to this tax.122 Although formally the law 
treats men and women equally, this equal treatment nevertheless 
leads to unequal outcomes because it primarily impacts women 
workers. 
The Preamble of CEDAW also indicates that the Convention 
contemplates something more than formal equality. For example, it 
states that “the full and complete development of a country, the 
welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum 
participation of women on equal terms with men in all fields.”123 A 
mere commitment to formal equality will not necessarily result in the 
maximum participation of women in all fields. Substantive equality 
acknowledges that women must be guaranteed not only equal 
opportunity, but also equal access to opportunity and equal 
outcomes.124
Article 3 provides further indication of the Convention’s embrace 
of substantive equality: Ensuring the “full development and 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTION WATCH, BUILDING CAPACITY FOR CHANGE: A 
TRAINING MANUAL ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST WOMEN (on file with author). 
 121. See INT’L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., EMPOWERING WOMEN AND 
FIGHTING POVERTY: COCOA AND LAND RIGHTS IN WEST AFRICA 6 (2002), 
available at http://www.ifpri.org/media/cocoa.pdf (recommending that the 
Ghanaian government inform women their recently acquired rights to own land in 
order to enable women to exercise those rights). 
 122. See MAID TO ORDER, supra note 1, at 42 (arguing that requiring employers 
to pay a security bond to the government encourages employers to place 
restrictions on their domestic servants that limit the servants’ mobility and 
communication with the outside world); see also CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 15 
(mandating that women have equal rights with men as to the movement of 
persons). 
 123. CEDAW, supra note 20, pmbl. 
 124. See OUR RIGHTS ARE NOT OPTIONAL, supra note 63, at 4 (noting that 
formal equality may not be sufficient to achieve nondiscrimination); see also 
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, It Takes a Vision: The Constitutionalization of Equality in 
Canada, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 363, 368 (2002) (describing substantive 
equality as affording “equality of opportunity and of result, not just similar 
treatment for those similarly situated”). 
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advancement of women” envisions both equality of access to 
opportunity and equality of result, a key tenet of substantive 
equality.125 Furthermore, the State is obliged to take “all appropriate 
measures” to provide for this advancement.126 With respect to 
equality of opportunity, women should have equal access to the 
resources of a country.127 Even if a State’s laws and policies 
guarantee equal protection for women, the State must also ensure 
that obstacles do not exist to bar women from the enjoyment and 
fulfillment of their human rights.128
The fact that CEDAW’s drafters intended it to provide for more 
than formal equality is further evidenced by Article 4, which permits 
States to enact temporary special measures to accelerate de facto 
equality between men and women.129 States are not simply permitted, 
but in fact are encouraged by the CEDAW Committee to adopt 
temporary special measures.130 Temporary special measures are 
provisional measures, such as positive action, preferential treatment, 
and quota systems, that are directed at women to help move them 
into a more equal situation with men.131 If the Convention aimed 
only to provide women with formal equality, there would be no need 
for these temporary special measures. States would simply be 
required to get rid of laws that formally discriminate against women, 
and enact provisions providing for formal equality. 
Finally, the CEDAW Committee itself has acknowledged in its 
concluding comments to various State Parties that State Parties 
should pursue the achievement of substantive equality. For example, 
 125. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 3 
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and 
cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full 
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of 
equality with men 
Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTION WATCH, BUILDING CAPACITY 
FOR CHANGE: A TRAINING MANUAL ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (on file with author), supra note 120. 
 128. Id. at 4. 
 129. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 4 (maintaining that these measures will 
not be considered as discrimination). 
 130. See Recommendation 5, supra note 114 (recommending that “States Parties 
make more use of temporary special measures”). 
 131. Id. 
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in 2005 the Committee recommended that Algeria adopt certain 
temporary special measures “so as to accelerate the realization of the 
substantive equality of rural women.”132 Similarly, the Committee 
urged Bhutan to “implement policies and programmes specifically 
addressed to women and girls . . . in order to accelerate the 
achievement of substantive equality.”133
The Committee’s vision of substantive equality, and its grounding 
in the text of CEDAW, has never been made clear; as previously 
explained, this paper seeks to fill that gap.134 The closest the 
Committee has come to articulating a vision of substantive equality 
occurs in several of its general recommendations, although the 
Committee has never explicitly mentioned substantive equality this 
context. For example, in its General Recommendation on violence 
against women, the Committee recommended that States take 
measures to overcome “attitudes and practices” that perpetuate 
violence against women and “should introduce education and public 
information programmes to help eliminate prejudices that hinder 
women’s equality.”135 Taking steps to overcome attitudes and 
prejudices moves beyond formal equality into the substantive model, 
aiming to create an environment where women have equal access to 
opportunity and results. Similarly, the General Recommendation on 
equality in marriage and family relations specifically acknowledges 
that de jure equality is not enough to fulfill a State’s obligations 
under the Convention because of the pervasive tendency for societies 
to treat women as inferior to men.136 Addressing and aiming to 
 132. See United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Algeria, ¶ 160, 
U.N. Doc. A/60/38 (2005) [hereinafter Algeria]. 
 133. See United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Bhutan, ¶ 106, 
U.N. Doc. A/59/38 (2004) [hereinafter Bhutan]. 
 134. See, e.g., Byrnes et al., supra note 93, at 115 (stating that equality under the 
law is insufficient on its own); OUR RIGHTS ARE NOT OPTIONAL, supra note 63, at 
4 (basing the Convention on three principles, one of which is substantive equality). 
 135. Recommendation 19, supra note 85, at ¶ 24(f). 
 136. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CEDAW General 
Recommendation 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. 
04/02/94 (Apr. 2, 1994) [hereinafter Recommendation 21]. The Recommendation 
notes that in some countries, de jure equality still does not exist, and that: 
[e]ven where de jure equality exists, all societies assign different roles, which are 
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improve social structures that appear to provide equality of 
opportunity but create de facto inequality comports with a 
substantive model of equality.137
iii. CEDAW’s Guarantee of Substantive Equality Provides Protection 
to Women Migrant Workers 
Substantive equality assists migrant workers in claiming their 
human rights. As Satterthwaite explains, “[i]n effect, whenever a 
pattern can be found in which a certain law or policy has a 
disproportionately negative impact on migrant women, 
discrimination is present and the state must take active steps to 
ensure women their equal rights,”138 unless the State can identify a 
legally permissible justification for its law or policy.139
As an example of the benefits of substantive equality, many states 
have labor legislation that does not cover domestic workers.140 If 
most domestic workers in the country are female, then such a law 
would have the effect of discriminating against women, even though 
there is no formal inequality because both male and female domestic 
regarded as inferior, to women . . . . In this way, principles of justice and equality 
contained in particular in article 16 and also in articles 2, 5 and 24 of the Convention 
are being violated. 
Id. 
 137. See Jason Morgan-Foster, Note, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and 
Beyond: A Comparative Look at Affirmative Action in Three Jurisdictions, 9 
WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 73, 80 (2003) (distinguishing 
between the goals of formal equality and substantive equality). 
 138. Satterthwaite, supra note 19, at 21. 
 139. Human rights law recognizes that a state may treat different persons or 
groups differentially in order to achieve a legitimate purpose. See, e.g., United 
Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-
Discrimination, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 10/11/89 (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter Comment 
No. 18]; United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Report on the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, at 115, U.N. Doc. 22/03/93 (Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter 
Racial Committee Report] (observing that “a differentiation of treatment will not 
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the 
objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope 
of article 1, paragraph 4, of the [CERD] Convention”); Case “Relating to Certain 
Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. 
Belgium (Merits), 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 10 (1968) (holding that principle of 
equality in European Convention is violated only if distinction has no objective 
and reasonable justification). 
 140. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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workers are excluded. Since the definition of discrimination 
encompassed by Article 1 includes laws that have the “effect or 
purpose”141 of discriminating against women, the State has an 
obligation under CEDAW Article 2 to undertake measures to 
eliminate that discrimination.142 A State violates its legal obligations 
under CEDAW by maintaining laws that exclude domestic workers 
from requirements covering mandatory days off, minimum wages, 
and other labor protections offered to workers in other fields, unless 
it has a legally permissible justification for doing so—that is, a 
legitimate justification that comports with the purpose of the 
Convention.143 Thus, State Parties to CEDAW have a legal 
obligation to alter their labor laws to better protect domestic workers, 
including the many women migrant workers who fill domestic 
service jobs. 
Because CEDAW is a non-discrimination treaty, the comparative 
group matters; however it is not clear what two groups should be 
compared to see if discrimination exists. One may argue that women 
domestic workers should be compared to male domestic workers; so 
long as male domestic workers are excluded from labor codes, 
discrimination against women does not exist if female domestic 
workers are similarly excluded. However, this argument fails to 
grasp the import of substantive equality: a problem exists in that 
women work more frequently in the domestic service sector than in 
other types of work that are protected by labor codes.144 Women in 
the work force should be compared to men in the work force—and if 
women exist in the work force in far fewer numbers than men, 
substantive equality examines that factor as well. CEDAW thus 
demands that States alter their labor codes to provide domestic
 141. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 1. 
 142. Id. art. 2 (agreeing to pursue non-discrimination by all appropriate means). 
 143. Cf. Comment No. 18, supra note 139, ¶ 13 (noting that human rights law 
recognizes that a state may treat different persons or groups differentially in order 
to achieve a legitimate purpose); Racial Committee Report, supra note 139, ¶ 2 
(ensuring that the Committee looks to see whether the differentiation of treatment 
has an effect contrary to the Convention); Case Relating, 6 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 
¶ 10 (stating that “the existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation 
the aim and effects of the measure under consideration”). 
 144. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR, CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEY 215 (2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/ 
cpsa2006.pdf (comparing the percentage of women in the domestic service 
industry with the percentage in other occupations).
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workers with the same benefits received by workers in male-
dominated jobs. 
D. STATE OBLIGATIONS 
On its own, substantive equality may not be a particularly helpful 
tool. Most of the abuses of migrant worker human rights take place 
at the hands of the employer or recruitment agency, rather than at the 
hands of the State.145 While the labor legislation discussed above is a 
prime example of a law that has the effect of discriminating against 
women, thus triggering the State Party’s obligations under CEDAW, 
there are few other obvious examples of State practices that directly 
discriminate against women migrant workers.146 A far bigger 
problem stems from States’ lack of worksite monitoring, enabling an 
environment where abuses such as passport confiscation, wage 
withholding, unfair contracts, and domestic violence take place.147
Significantly, CEDAW obligates State Parties to eliminate 
discrimination against women by private actors as well. As Article 
2(e) sets forth, States must “take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization 
or enterprise.”148 Combined with CEDAW’s guarantee of substantive 
equality, the State obligations detailed in Article 2 enable migrant 
workers and their advocates to claim that a State has violated its legal 
obligations under CEDAW by failing to monitor the recruitment 
agencies and employers who frequently commit abusive practices.149 
 145. See supra Part I (outlining the nature of the human rights violations that 
migrant workers suffer). 
 146. See Women Migrant Workers, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 17, 21 (describing 
several other examples, such as a lack of access to health services, a lack of access 
to the justice system, and ineligibility for legal aid from the government). 
 147. See Migrant Workers in the Middle East, UNION VIEW (Int’l Trade Union 
Confed., Brussels, Belgium), Dec. 2007, at 2, 12-13, available at http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/VS_Jordanie_EN.pdf (providing examples of abusive and unfair 
work environments throughout the Middle East); Felipe Gómez Isa, The Optional 
Protocol for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women: Strengthening the Protection Mechanisms of Women’s Human 
Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 291, 300-01 (2003) (arguing that most 
serious violations of women’s rights occur in the private sphere). 
 148. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 2(e). 
 149. Cf., e.g., Ms. A.T. v. Hungary, Communication No 2/2003, Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 9.2 (Jan. 26, 2005) 
[hereinafter Ms. A.T.] (considering a woman’s claim that the State had failed to 
uphold its CEDAW obligations by not protecting her from her abusive husband); 
874 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:843 
 
Given that so many violations of women migrant workers’ rights 
take place at the hands of private actors, State Parties’ obligations 
under Article 2(e) play an essential role in creating the States’ legal 
obligations towards women migrant workers under CEDAW. 
The notion that a State Party can violate CEDAW by failing to 
effectively monitor and regulate the conduct of private parties is 
neither a novel idea nor a stretch of the law. The CEDAW 
Committee has previously held a State Party responsible for the 
failure to protect a woman from abuse of her human rights by a 
private person.150 Because the State failed to protect the woman from 
her former husband’s battering,151 it violated her rights under 
CEDAW.152 The Committee made a number of recommendations to 
the State Party, including that the State act “with due diligence to 
prevent and respond to . . . violence against women” and to “provide 
victims of domestic violence with safe and prompt access to 
justice.”153 The State’s failure to protect the victim from abuse by a 
private citizen can be analogized to the situation of women migrant 
workers. States frequently fail to protect migrants from abuse at the 
hands of private employers and recruitment agencies.154 Because the 
Committee has already demonstrated a willingness to apply CEDAW 
to areas where a State failed to prevent discrimination by a private 
party, taking similar action in the situation of a State’s failure to 
see also Optional Protocol, supra note 23, arts. 1-7 (describing the 
communications and inquiry procedures of the Optional Protocol which may be 
used to make such claims to the CEDAW Committee). Migrant workers and their 
advocates may make arguments using CEDAW in domestic legal proceedings. See 
id. art. 4(1) (providing that the Committee will not entertain a communication until 
all domestic remedies have been exhausted or otherwise deemed ineffective). 
 150. See Ms. A.T., supra note 149, ¶ 9.4 (analyzing the issue pursuant to the 
communications procedure of the Optional Protocol); see also Optional Protocol, 
supra note 23, arts. 1-7. 
 151. See Ms. A.T., supra note 149, ¶ 9.4 (ruling complainant was unable 
through civil or criminal proceedings to bar her former husband from her 
apartment, could not get a restraining or protection order because those options did 
not exist in the State, and was unable to flee to a shelter because there were not any 
shelters equipped to accept her with her children, one of whom was disabled). 
 152. Id. ¶ 9.6. 
 153. Id. ¶ 9.6 II(b), (g); see also infra notes 161–72 and accompanying text 
(discussing the due diligence standard). 
 154. See Elaine Dewhurst, Agencies of Slavery: the Exploitation of Migrant 
Workers by Recruitment Agencies, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 377, 383-84 (2007) 
(observing that despite existing regulation of private parties, migrant workers still 
suffer from exploitation). 
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protect migrant workers does not require an expansive interpretation 
of the Convention. A State that not only fails to monitor private 
parties recruiting and employing women migrant workers, but also 
denies women migrant workers access to its justice system, would 
violate CEDAW just as Hungary did in the Ms. A.T. case.155
The CEDAW Committee has further recognized the obligation of 
State Parties to eliminate discrimination by private actors in its 
general recommendations and concluding comments.156 In its general 
recommendation on violence against women, the Committee stated, 
“[u]nder general international law and specific human rights 
covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail 
to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to 
investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing 
compensation.”157 This comment constitutes an endorsement of the 
notion of due diligence as applicable under CEDAW,158 a standard 
first articulated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
order to expand the concept of state responsibility to account for 
human rights abuses committed by private actors.159
In international law, “the doctrine of state responsibility [typically] 
holds a state accountable for breaches of international obligations 
committed by or attributable to the state.”160 However, particularly 
with respect to human rights law, the concept of state responsibility 
has expanded to account for rights violations committed by private 
actors.161 The due diligence standard first developed by the Inter-
 155. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (finding that Hungary 
violated a woman’s rights under CEDAW by failing to protect her from brutality 
subjected upon her by her ex-husband). 
 156. See Recommendation 24, supra note 91, ¶ 31(d) (noting that the Committee 
recommended that State Parties “[m]onitor the provision of health services to 
women by public, non-governmental and private organizations, to ensure equal 
access and quality of care”). 
 157. Recommendation 19, supra note 85, ¶ 9. 
 158. See Byrnes et al., supra note 93, at 52 (observing that following 
Recommendation 19, supra note 85, the CEDAW Committee has continued to use 
the concept of due diligence as an appropriate standard for measuring State 
responsibility); see also supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing due 
diligence standard in the A.T. case). 
 159. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (describing the due diligence 
standard articulated in the Velasquez-Rodriguez case). 
 160. Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women’s Human 
Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 127 (1994). 
 161. Id. at 151 (explaining that while individuals are generally not subject to 
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American Court has played an important role in this expansion, by 
providing a standard by which to measure state responsibility. A 
state cannot be held accountable for all harms inflicted by private 
actors, so it is necessary to develop criteria to determine when a state 
is responsible.162
In Velasquez-Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court held that 
international responsibility can attach to a State for an illegal act 
which, although not directly imputable to the State, nevertheless 
renders the State responsible because of “the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation [of human rights] or to respond to it.”163 The 
court explained that the State has an obligation to “prevent, 
investigate, and punish any violation of the rights recognized” in the 
Inter-American Convention.164 Further, the court asserted that it is 
the State’s legal duty to implement the mechanisms necessary to 
prevent violations of the Convention and to engage in meaningful 
investigations of violations, as well as identify those responsible, 
impose punishment, and ensure compensation to the victim.165 The 
duty to prevent violations of human rights requires the State to use 
all “means of a legal, political, administrative, and cultural nature 
that promote the protection of human rights and to ensure that 
violations are treated as illegal acts.”166
The Velasquez-Rodriguez concept of due diligence has been 
accepted by other international tribunals167 and human rights 
liability under international law, states may be liable for the results of an 
individual’s actions under some circumstances). 
 162. See INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
COMPANIES 51-52 (2002) (arguing that holding states accountable for all private 
actions would trivialize human rights). 
 163. Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras (Merits), 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ 
articulos/seriec_04_ing.pdf. 
 164. See id. ¶ 166 (reasoning that carrying out these obligations ensures “the 
free and full exercise” of the rights enumerated in the Inter-American Convention). 
 165. Id. ¶ 174 (limiting a State’s legal obligation to human rights violations that 
occur under its jurisdiction). 
 166. See id. ¶ 175 (cautioning that the existence of a violation does not 
necessarily signify a failure to take preventive measures). 
 167. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J., No. 91,  
¶430 (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf 
(describing the notion of due diligence as critically important in determining 
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bodies168—including the CEDAW Committee169—and provides a 
useful mechanism for determining the extent of a State’s obligations 
under CEDAW. Where a State fails to make any attempt to monitor 
recruitment agencies or private employers, or take other “reasonable 
steps” to prevent rights violations, the State fails to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of migrant workers’ rights. 
With respect to specific provisions of CEDAW, for example, 
where it has been documented that employers frequently subject their 
domestic servants to forced confinement, a State may be failing to 
act with due diligence to protect women’s equal rights as to the 
movement of persons.170 When recruitment agencies consistently 
mislead migrant workers about their placements and wages, the 
State’s lack of monitoring of recruitment agencies may violate the 
State’s obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill a woman’s “right to 
free choice of profession and employment.”171
whether state has met its obligation to prevent genocide). 
 168. See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, CCPR General 
Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004) 
[hereinafter Comment No. 31] (describing the legal obligation imposed on state 
parties to the ICCPR). 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required 
by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of 
States Parties' permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by 
private persons or entities. 
 Id. (emphasis added); see also Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global 
Actors Accountable Under International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 691, 
764-66 (2006) (discussing the due diligence standard as applied by several 
international tribunals). 
 169. See Recommendation 19, supra note 85, ¶ 9 (embracing the due diligence 
standard based on both “general international law and specific human rights 
agreements”). 
 170. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 15 (including the freedom to choose 
residence and domicile); see also Women Migrant Workers, supra note 88, ¶ 26(d). 
State parties should ensure that employers and recruiters do not confiscate or destroy 
travel or identity documents belonging to women migrants. State parties should also 
take steps to end the forced seclusion or locking in the homes of women migrant 
workers, especially those working in domestic service. Police officers should be 
trained to protect the rights of women migrant workers from such abuses. 
Id. 
 171. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 11(c); see also Women Migrant Workers, 
supra note 88, ¶ 26(h) (imploring states to protect women migrant workers’ rights 
by implementing regulations, monitoring private parties, and prosecuting rights 
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State obligations under Article 2 interact with substantive equality 
in order to mandate that State Parties to CEDAW protect and provide 
for the rights of women migrant workers. For example, when 
employers withhold wages from domestic workers, fail to pay 
domestic workers their full wages according to contracts, or enter 
into contracts with migrant workers for substandard wages, Article 
11(d) of the Convention has been violated.172 Women migrant 
workers in these situations have not been guaranteed “the right to 
equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in 
respect of work of equal value.”173 These violations of the right to 
equal remuneration by private employers primarily occur in the 
domestic service sector, which employs far more women than 
men.174 Thus, a substantive equality reading of the Convention 
provision, combined with the State’s obligation to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of rights, leads to the argument that 
the State has failed to take “all appropriate measures” to eliminate 
discrimination against women under Article 11.175
Although the State does not have an obligation to prevent every 
single situation of abuse, it must put some sort of framework in place 
that would help detect and prevent abuses and punish violators.176 
For example, in 2004 New York passed a law requiring licensed 
employment agencies to provide applicants for domestic or 
household work, as well as their potential employers, a written 
statement detailing the rights of the worker and the obligations of the 
employer.177 Employment agencies must keep a statement on file for 
violations). 
 172. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 11(d). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Cf. supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing states’ 
obligations when laws disproportionately affect migrant women). 
 175. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 11(1). 
 176. The General Recommendation on Women Migrant Workers explains that 
States should have such monitoring systems, but does not flesh out the details of 
such systems. See Women Migrant Workers, supra note 88, ¶ 26(h) (“State parties 
should adopt regulations and design monitoring systems to ensure that recruiting 
agents and employers respect the rights of all women migrant workers. State 
parties should closely monitor recruiting agencies and prosecute them for acts of 
violence, coercion, deception, or exploitation.”). 
 177. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 691(1) (Consol. 2007) (requiring employer to 
provide full text of statement on employer’s website, if any); see also id. § 721 
(defining “employer” as “any person conducting a business or employing another” 
but not including the “government or any political or civil subdivision or other 
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three years signed by the employer indicating that the employer read 
and understands the statement.178 The employment agency must also 
provide job applicants with a statement, approved by the labor 
commissioner, describing the job conditions of each potential 
employment situation, wages, hours of work, the kind of services to 
be performed, and certain other information.179 The labor 
commission and persons aggrieved by violations of these laws may 
institute criminal proceedings, where violators of the act will be 
found guilty of a misdemeanor, and can be subject to a fine, 
imprisonment, or both.180 Laws such as this one might satisfy a State 
Party’s obligations to take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination by private actors under the due diligence standard. 
“Appropriate measures” and the measures each State Party must take 
to fulfill its obligations will likely differ for each State. 
In sum, a violation of the principle of non-discrimination against 
women, who are guaranteed substantive equality with men under 
CEDAW, combined with State Parties’ obligations under Article 2, 
reveals a legal requirement for State Parties to CEDAW to respect, 
protect, and fulfill the human rights of women migrant workers 
guaranteed by the Convention. 
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CEDAW TO THE 
RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 
Undocumented migrant workers pose a special problem for human 
rights advocates.181 In one view, providing rights for migrant workers 
agency thereof”). The law specifically notes that the domestic and household 
employment industry disproportionately impacts women migrant workers: 
The placement of domestic or household employees into the homes of employers 
creates special problems, including the risk of abuse and exploitation. The majority of 
domestic or household employees in the State of New York are immigrant women of 
color who, because of race and sex discrimination, language barriers and immigration 
status, are particularly vulnerable to unfair labor practices. 
Id. § 691 (1) (discussing legislative intent in historical and statutory notes of § 691 
(1)). 
 178. Id. § 691(2) (Consol. 2007). 
 179. See id. § 691(1) (clarifying that such statements must embody provisions of 
both state and federal law). 
 180. See id. § 694 (stipulating that the fine shall not exceed one thousand dollars 
and imprisonment shall be for no more than one year). 
 181. See Bosniak, supra note 26, at 746-51 (providing a thorough summary of 
competing perspectives on the extension of human rights protections to 
undocumented migrant workers). 
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in an undocumented situation both encourages and rewards 
violations of a state’s borders and its immigration laws.182 Although 
principles of state sovereignty grant each state the right to determine 
its own criteria governing admission to the state,183 the state must 
comply with its treaty obligations in doing so.184 In addition to a 
 182. See RYSZARD CHOLEWINSKI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THEIR PROTECTION IN COUNTRIES OF EMPLOYMENT 187 & 
n.216 (1997) (describing the position of Germany and the United States during the 
drafting of the MWC); Bosniak, supra note 26, at 749 (discussing the view of 
many governments that extending more rights to irregular migrant workers would 
encourage and reward further violations of state territorial borders); see also id. at 
742 (describing the designation of “irregular” migrants as presupposing either the 
breach or failure of national territorial borders, and noting that rule of territorial 
sovereignty is a fundamental governing principle of international legal system). 
 183. See Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 7, art. 79 (“Nothing in the 
present Convention shall affect the right of each State Party to establish the criteria 
governing admission of migrant workers and members of their families.”); United 
Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position 
of Aliens Under the Covenant, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 11/04/86 (Apr. 11, 1986) [hereinafter 
Comment No. 15] (“It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will 
admit to its territory.”); Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented 
Immigrants and the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 571 (1996) 
(describing this principle as a “cardinal norm” of state sovereignty); CHOLEWINSKI, 
supra note 182, at 192-93 (discussing the origins of Article 79 of the Migrant 
Workers Convention); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human 
Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1371-72 
(1999) (“It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation 
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to 
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in 
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.” (quoting 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892))). 
 184. See, e.g., Liu v. Russia, App. No. 42086/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 49 (2007); Gül 
v. Switzerland, App. No. 23218/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 38 (1996) (reaffirming the 
principle that “[as] a matter of well-established international law and subject to its 
treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its 
territory.”) (emphasis added). In cases before it, the European Court of Human 
Rights commonly considers a state’s obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and securing the right to respect for family and private 
life, respectively. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 3, 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter 
European Convention on Human Rights]. Therefore, despite the state’s right to 
control entry into its territory, it cannot expel an individual to a country where that 
individual would face a real risk of torture, inhuman, or degrading punishment. See 
Sheekh v. Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 135 (2007). Similarly, 
in cases where the expulsion or denial of entry to a non-national would disrupt 
family life, the court determines whether the government has struck a fair balance 
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state’s sovereign right to control its borders through its migration 
policy, a state also has the right to regulate its domestic employment 
policy.185 International law does not regard documentation status as a 
prohibited basis of discrimination.186 Furthermore, human rights law 
has developed through state consent,187 and states have not consented 
to granting rights to those not lawfully within their borders.188
between its own interests in controlling immigration and the non-national’s 
interests. Tuquabo-Tekle v. Netherlands, App. No. 60665/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 44 
(2005). The United Nations General Assembly has also urged states to review and 
revise their “immigration laws, policies, and practices so that they are free of racial 
discrimination and compatible with their obligations under international human 
rights instruments.” G.A. Res. 57/195, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/195 (Feb. 27, 
2003). 
 185. See Doug Cassel, Equal Labor Rights for Undocumented Migrant Workers, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND 
MIGRANT WORKERS 477, 487, 501-02 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2006) (observing 
that States may prosecute and imprison migrants who obtain employment in their 
countries without permission); see also William R. Tamayo, When the “Coloreds” 
Are Neither Black nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and 
Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 28 (1995) (discussing how MWC recognizes 
state power to bar employment of undocumented workers). 
 186. Cassel, supra note 185, at 502. See, e.g., Civil Rights Convention, supra 
note 83, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.”); American Convention on Human Rights, 
art. 1, Nov. 22 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] 
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and 
full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
economic status, birth, or any other social condition. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human being. 
Id. 
 187. Cf. Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive 
Law Context, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 417, 438 (2000) (noting that States must 
consent to international human rights law arrangements in order for human rights 
protections to become more than a matter of domestic law). 
 188. See Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate Over Trafficking in Women: 
Definitions, Paradigms, and Contexts, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 101 (1998) 
(describing international law as having a general tendency “to exclude 
undocumented aliens from fundamental rights and freedoms”); cf. LOUIS HENKIN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 174 (1995) (noting that the United 
Nations Charter did not erode the requirement of state consent to new human rights 
law). 
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In another view, human rights are universal, and all humans can 
claim them. “Most fundamental rights are guaranteed to ‘all persons 
[ . . . ] subject to [a State’s] jurisdiction,’” including undocumented 
migrant workers.189 Although an undocumented migrant worker may 
have violated a state’s immigration laws, this act does not give the 
state the right to ignore the fundamental human rights guaranteed to 
all people.190 In fact, “the legal and social status of irregular migrant 
workers” in receiving states makes it all the more urgent that human 
rights protections are extended to them.191 Furthermore, in response 
to the argument that providing rights for undocumented migrant 
workers encourages and rewards violations of a state’s borders and 
immigration laws, a counter-argument states that according more 
rights to undocumented migrants will discourage employers from 
hiring them, thereby improving conditions for national workers and 
documented migrants.192
The challenge, then, is to find a legal basis for upholding a state 
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of 
undocumented migrant workers within its territory while still taking 
into account core principles of state sovereignty. Most of the human 
rights treaty bodies have not addressed this dilemma in a satisfactory 
manner, instead focusing on distinctions between citizenship and 
non-citizenship, rather than distinctions between documented and 
undocumented non-citizens.193 Occasionally, a treaty body has 
 189. Cassel, supra note 185, at 488; see also Chuang, supra note 188, at 101 
(noting that in theory states must treat non-citizens in a way that does not violate 
internationally recognized human rights). 
 190. See The People’s Movement for Human Rights Education, Human Rights 
and Migrant Workers, http://www.pdhre.org/rights/migrants.html (last visited Jan. 
24, 2009) (“All persons, regardless of their nationality, race, legal or other status, 
are entitled to fundamental human rights and basic labor protections, including 
migrant workers and their families.”); see also Bosniak, supra note 26, at 748 
(stating that advocates for protecting the human rights of irregular migrant workers 
invoke the universality of human rights). 
 191. See Bosniak, supra note 26, at 747 (contending that undocumented migrant 
workers are under constant threat of removal or prosecution). 
 192. See id. at 749 (noting that this will also serve the interests of border 
control); CHOLEWINSKI, supra note 182, at 187 & n.216 (mentioning that the 
United States and Germany want to restrict the definition of ‘migrant worker’ to 
‘regular’ migrants). 
 193. See Comment No. 15, supra note 183, at ¶ 9 (discussing the rights of 
“aliens,” without clearly stating whether this meant all non-citizens within a State, 
or only those lawfully present). The Human Rights Committee does state that, 
2009] A RIGHTS BASED APPROACH 883 
 
indicated in concluding comments to State Parties that 
undocumented persons can claim rights under the various treaty 
bodies.194 However, in general, the treaty bodies have not directly 
addressed the applicability of the core human rights treaties to 
undocumented persons.195 I turn next to the ways in which CEDAW 
can contribute to providing a legal basis for protecting and fulfilling 
the rights of undocumented migrant workers. 
A. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANT WOMEN IN A CEDAW STATE CAN 
CLAIM THE RIGHTS CONTAINED IN THE CONVENTION 
One can make a plausible argument that CEDAW applies in its 
entirety to undocumented migrant women in a receiving state that is 
a party to CEDAW. CEDAW guarantees rights to “women” and does 
not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens.196 Furthermore, 
“[t]he particular rights of article 13 only protect those aliens who are lawfully in 
the territory of a State party,” perhaps indicating that all other articles in the 
Convention apply to all aliens. Id. This interpretation has limited support in the 
case law, however, as seen in A v. Australia where the Committee found that the 
decision to keep a person in detention—even a person who entered the country 
unlawfully—must be reviewed periodically to comply with Article 9. United 
Nations General Assembly [UNGA], Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under 
Article 5, Paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 
1997). 
 194. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: Spain, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/CO/6 (Apr. 28, 2004) 
[hereinafter CERD Spain] (“The Committee . . . recommends that the State party 
ensure the enjoyment of human rights for all foreigners in the country, whether 
documented or undocumented, regular or irregular.”); Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Spain, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.99 
(June 7, 2004) [hereinafter ESC Spain] (expressing concern for the well-being of 
undocumented workers and their inability to demand that States uphold their 
fundamental rights and freedoms). 
 195. See supra note 55-58 and accompanying text (declaring that the Migrant 
Workers’ Convention is, of course, an exception, as its text explicitly contemplates 
applying certain of its provisions to undocumented workers). 
 196. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. This is presumably the approach 
of the CEDAW Committee, which included undocumented migrant women within 
the scope of its newest General Recommendation. See Women Migrant Workers, 
supra note 88, at ¶ 4 (“The scope of this general recommendation is limited to 
addressing the situations of the following categories of migrant women . . . 
(a) Women migrant workers who migrate independently; Women migrant workers 
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because CEDAW does not have a jurisdictional provision, by default 
it applies to each party with respect to its entire territory.197 From a 
textual perspective, then, CEDAW applies to “women” in the 
territory of a State Party, including undocumented migrant 
women.198
However, flatly proclaiming that a State has obligations to all 
women within its territory may fail to fully account for core 
principles of state sovereignty.199 Human rights bodies have 
consistently acknowledged differentiation based on citizenship and 
immigration status is permissible, as long as it is proportional and for 
the purposes of a legitimate aim. For example, in its general 
recommendation on discrimination against non-citizens, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination explained, 
“[u]nder the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship 
or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for 
such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and 
purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate 
aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.”200 
who join their spouses or other members of their families who are also workers;  
(c) Undocumented women migrant workers who fall into any of the above 
categories.”). 
 197. See Vienna Convention, supra note 94, art. 29 (“Unless a different 
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding 
upon each party in respect of its entire territory.”); see also Byrnes et al., supra 
note 93, at 15. 
 198. Cf. Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Rights of Migrant Workers One Year On: 
Transformation or Consolidation?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 113, 144-45 (2004) (noting 
that the Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 15 on the position of 
aliens, “emphasized that the rights in the Covenant apply to all individuals within 
the territory of a state and subject to its jurisdiction, making no distinction between 
regular and irregular aliens”). While Sivakumaran’s interpretation of General 
Comment 15 is plausible, it is equally plausible to read the General Comment as 
setting out rights for aliens lawfully in the territory, as the Committee did not 
specifically discuss undocumented aliens. However, Sivakumaran’s interpretation 
of General Comment 15 is bolstered by the fact that the ICCPR itself specifically 
refers in certain articles to persons or aliens “lawfully in the territory of a state,” 
while conferring rights on “everyone” and “anyone” in other articles. Compare 
Civil Rights Convention, supra note 83, arts. 12-13, with id. arts. 6-11. 
 199. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (discussing state’s 
sovereign right to regulate its immigration and employment policies). 
 200. CERD General Recommendation 30 ¶ 4 CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004). 
Similarly, in Advisory Opinion 18, the Inter-American Court acknowledged that 
states may treat differentially documented and undocumented migrants, or 
migrants and nationals, if the “differential treatment is reasonable, objective, 
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Presumably, a State’s sovereign interest in regulating its borders 
qualifies as a legitimate aim, although a State must still ensure that 
its measures to regulate immigration and employment respect human 
rights.201
Furthermore, States may hesitate to incur further international 
legal obligations if those obligations must be extended even to those 
who have broken a State’s laws.202 David Martin has argued that 
extending legal protections to undocumented peoples, who have 
violated a state’s territorial sovereignty, may create a backlash that 
will ultimately harm the migrant workers.203 Thus, expanding human 
rights standards too greatly may lead states to respond by defensively 
asserting their sovereignty.204
Even assuming undocumented women migrant workers cannot 
claim all of the rights guaranteed by CEDAW simply by virtue of 
moving into the territory of a CEDAW State Party, the Convention 
still plays a useful role by helping to expand the scope of labor rights 
guaranteed to migrant women because of their employment 
relationship. 
B. CEDAW ADDS TO THE RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANT 
WORKERS BY EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF LABOR RIGHTS 
i. The OP-18 Analysis 
In September 2003, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
handed down a landmark advisory opinion in which the court held 
proportionate, and does not harm human rights.” Juridical Condition and Rights of 
the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 119 (Sept. 17, 2003). 
 201. See Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 119 (reporting that the Inter-American court, in discussing 
differential treatment, specifically explained that States may establish mechanisms 
to control the flow of undocumented migrants into and out of its territory, although 
the State must guarantee due process and respect for human dignity). 
 202. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Human Rights of Migrants, in MIGRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 173, 177 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent 
Chetail eds., 2003) (arguing that state “[r]esistance to legal obligations that might 
impede enforcement measures to combat illegal migration” plays a role in 
deterring ratification of the MWC). 
 203. See David A. Martin, The Authority and Responsibility of States, in 
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS, supra note 202, at 31, 32 
(remarking that migrant workers would be harmed only after entering a state). 
 204. Id. at 44. 
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that “[a] migrant acquires rights as a worker, which must be 
recognized and guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irregular 
status in the State of employment.”205 The court relied primarily on 
the principle of non-discrimination and the employment relationship 
as the source of rights for migrant workers. 
First, the court held that the prohibition on discrimination has 
attained jus cogens status, giving rise to obligations erga omnes.206 
Because the principle of equality and non-discrimination was found 
to be a jus cogens norm, the court reasoned that every migrant 
worker, whether documented or undocumented, was entitled to non-
discrimination and equality before the law.207 While a State may treat 
undocumented migrants differently from documented migrants or 
nationals, the differential treatment must be reasonable, objective, 
and proportionate, and may not harm human rights.208
Secondly, the court pointed to the employment relationship as a 
source of rights for undocumented migrant workers: once a person 
enters a State and enters into an employment relationship, that person 
acquires labor rights in the State of employment, regardless of his 
undocumented status.209 States and individuals within the State are 
not required to offer employment to undocumented migrants, but 
once the employment relationship is begun, it confers labor rights on
 205. Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 134, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
425cd8eb4.html; see also Beth Lyon, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Defines Unauthorized Migrant Workers’ Rights for the Hemisphere: A Comment 
on Advisory Opinion 18, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 547, 548 (2004). 
 206. See Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 110; see also Lyon, supra note 205, at 587 (noting that the 
opinion marked the first time a human rights tribunal had found non-discrimination 
to be a jus cogens obligation); Sarah H. Cleveland, Legal Status and Rights of 
Undocumented Workers, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 462 (2005) (adding that the 
decision was also “the most extensive articulation to date of the workplace rights 
of undocumented workers”). 
 207. Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 118. 
 208. Id. ¶ 119. Thus, for example, a state is permitted to establish mechanisms to 
control the entry into and departure from its territory with respect to undocumented 
migrants, but these mechanisms must comport with guarantees of due process and 
respect for human dignity. See id. 
 209. Id. ¶¶ 133-134. 
2009] A RIGHTS BASED APPROACH 887 
 
the worker.210 These labor rights include all “rights recognized to 
workers by national and international legislation.”211
By examining the differential treatment of undocumented workers 
through the framework of non-discrimination, the court failed to set a 
minimum of rights guaranteed to undocumented migrant workers.212 
Instead, states may not withhold from migrant workers the 
protections available to other, legally authorized workers.213 As a 
result, migrant workers in states with more robust worker protections 
will be entitled to greater protection of rights.214 If documented 
workers do not have labor rights, then there is no basis for using a 
non-discrimination treaty such as CEDAW to argue for 
undocumented worker rights. 
However, the court did identify certain “inalienable rights,” 
including the prohibitions on forced labor and child labor, “rights 
corresponding to freedom of association and to organize and join a 
trade union, [ . . . ] fair wages for work performed, social security, 
judicial and administrative guarantees, and a working day of 
reasonable length with adequate working conditions, [ . . . ] rest and 
compensation.”215 The court also stated that even undocumented 
migrant workers should have access to courts, and although a 
migrant worker may face deportation, she should still have the right 
to be represented in court, to ensure full recognition of the labor 
rights she acquired as a worker.216
 210. Id. ¶¶ 135-136. 
 211. Id. ¶ 155. This conception of rights includes “rights embodied in the 
Constitution, labor legislation, collective agreements, agreements established by 
law, decrees,” specific and local practices, and “in any international treaty to which 
the state is a party.” Id. Domestic and international norms should be interpreted in 
a manner that best protects the individual worker, so that the domestic norm should 
be applied where it is more favorable than the international norm, and the 
international norm applied when it is more favorable than the domestic norm. Id.  
¶ 156. 
 212. See Lyon, supra note 205, at 584 (discussing the difference between 
analyzing distinct treatment of unauthorized workers as an economic, social, and 
cultural rights violation versus a violation of non-discrimination and equality). 
 213. Cleveland, supra note 206, at 464. 
 214. See id. (giving the example of rights for undocumented workers in the U.S. 
agriculture industry). 
 215. Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 157. 
 216. Id. ¶ 159. 
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Although its advisory jurisdiction merely interprets the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights,217 the Inter-American 
Court’s human rights jurisprudence has often been influential and 
adopted by other human rights bodies.218 For example, the Inter-
American Court developed the due diligence standard to hold states 
accountable for human rights violations not directly committed by 
state actors; although this development was based on an 
interpretation of the Inter-American Convention, numerous other 
human rights bodies have adopted it.219 In considering the rights of 
undocumented migrant workers, other human rights bodies, 
including the CEDAW Committee, should similarly adopt the OP-18 
analysis—particularly recognizing the employment relationship as a 
source of rights. Looking at the employment relationship in this way 
strikes a proper balance between state sovereignty on the one hand, 
and human rights on the other. States may regulate and keep 
undocumented persons out of their borders, but once an employment 
relationship is formed, certain fundamental human rights cannot be 
denied. An employee does not forfeit all human rights protection by 
entering a state with an undocumented status.220 However, the State 
may take measures to prevent the employment relationship in the 
first place.221
Other international tribunals should adopt the OP-18 analysis 
because it provides the optimal framework for dealing with questions 
concerning the applicability of human rights law to undocumented 
workers. Furthermore, the OP-18 analysis is particularly ripe for 
adoption by other tribunals, as the Inter-American Court interpreted 
not only the Inter-American Convention, but also the Universal 
 217. See JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (2003) (noting that, as an advisory 
opinion, the decision does not create legal obligations, even for parties to the 
Convention). However, advisory opinions do “strengthen the protections provided 
by the Inter-American human rights system.” Id. at 33. 
 218. Cf. id. (explaining that the Inter-American Court contributes to the evolving 
law of international human rights through its advisory opinions). 
 219. See Velásquez-Rodríguez, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 174-
175. 
 220. Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 122 (stating that migrants should have certain minimum guarantees 
of due process regardless of their legal status). 
 221. Id. ¶ 135 (declaring that states and employers do not have to hire migrants 
that are in the country illegally). 
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Declaration of Human Rights and ICCPR in reaching its 
conclusions.222
ii. The CEDAW Contribution 
According to the OP-18 framework, when a migrant worker enters 
into an employment relationship, she gains recognition of her labor 
rights, including all rights recognized to workers by domestic and 
international law.223 CEDAW can thus increase the scope of human 
rights recognized to undocumented migrant women by providing a 
foundation for expanding the labor rights granted to workers. 
For women migrants working in a State Party to CEDAW, Article 
11 of the Convention provides a direct source of labor rights for 
workers: Women are guaranteed, on an equal basis with men, the 
right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to equal 
remuneration, the right to equal treatment in respect of work of equal 
value, the right to social security, the right to paid leave, the right to 
the protection of health and safety in working conditions, and various 
other labor rights.224 CEDAW provides a direct source of labor rights 
because State Parties have agreed to this international legal 
obligation. So long as a State grants labor rights to documented, male 
workers, it must grant those same rights to documented, female 
workers, per CEDAW. 225 The OP-18 framework then transfers these 
rights, provided by international law, to undocumented workers, 
male and female, because the employment relationship guarantees 
these workers all labor rights recognized by international law, 
including CEDAW.226
It is equally important, however, to recognize that CEDAW can be 
used as a mechanism to expand the domestic labor rights granted to 
workers. I have previously discussed how the substantive equality 
and non-discrimination provisions contained within CEDAW require 
State Parties to amend labor legislation that excludes domestic 
workers from labor protections involving overtime pay, a day of rest, 
 222. Id. ¶ 55. 
 223. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
 224. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 11(1). 
 225. Id. art. 11 (listing the rights of equality for women in the field of 
employment). 
 226. See Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 148 (declaring that States must ensure the human rights of 
workers whether they are citizens or foreigners). 
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regulation of hours, and minimum wage.227 Though a domestic law 
requires amendment because of the rights CEDAW affords to 
women lawfully within the territory of the State Party, the new law’s 
protections are then extended to undocumented migrant women 
through their employment relationship per the OP-18 framework. 
The employment relationship provides the source through which 
undocumented migrant women can claim their labor rights under the 
new law. 
Combining CEDAW with the OP-18 analysis to provide rights for 
undocumented workers is a two-step process. First, women migrant 
workers make use of CEDAW domestically to change the law for 
documented women domestic workers. To use our familiar example, 
a State that provides overtime pay to workers but excludes domestic 
workers from this benefit violates CEDAW.228 Because domestic 
worker jobs are primarily held by women, substantive equality 
requires that this predominantly female-filled type of work contain 
the same benefits as male-dominated work—such as overtime pay 
and days off—in order to achieve equality in the workforce. 
Comparing women to men to look at discrimination in the workforce 
in a State, CEDAW demands a change in the law. Thus, by using 
CEDAW to change domestic law, documented women domestic 
workers gain new rights. 
Second, undocumented workers are then compared to documented 
workers under the OP-18 analysis. Documented domestic workers 
have gained labor rights due to CEDAW—for example, labor 
legislation containing overtime pay, a minimum wage, and other 
benefits now includes these workers. The OP-18 framework provides 
that undocumented domestic workers can claim labor rights due to 
their employment status.229 Under the OP-18 non-discrimination 
framework, undocumented workers can claim all labor rights 
recognized to workers in national legislation.230 These rights now 
include overtime pay and other benefits for domestic workers. 
Undocumented workers can thus now claim these rights too, once an 
 227. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. 
 228. See CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 11(d) (stating that women should get 
equal treatment for performing work of equal value to men). 
 229. See generally Lyon, supra note 205 (discussing the impact of the OP-18 
framework on the status of undocumented domestic workers). 
 230. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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employment relationship has begun. Using CEDAW to expand the 
nexus of labor rights that all workers can claim thus expands the 
rights owed to undocumented workers. 
This analysis also takes care of the comparative group problem 
that arises with non-discrimination treaties: here, the argument that 
undocumented women migrant workers should be compared to 
undocumented male migrant workers to determine what rights must 
be provided under the OP-18 framework. Under my analysis, the 
female workforce is first compared to the male workforce to gain 
more rights for women working lawfully within a State (comparator 
group one).231 In the second step, it does not matter if a narrow 
comparative group is used—comparing undocumented women 
domestic workers to documented women domestic workers 
(comparator group two)—because rights for documented domestic 
workers have already been expanded. Undocumented women 
migrant workers are not compared to undocumented male migrant 
workers, because the OP-18 framework compares the labor rights 
offered to documented workers as opposed to other undocumented 
workers.232 In this second step, it is not CEDAW’s provision of non-
discrimination that is used to advance rights, but rather, the jus 
cogens norm of non-discrimination recognized in OP-18. 
To look at another example, under CEDAW’s substantive equality 
model a State may have an obligation to provide a tribunal or other 
forum for women to bring complaints of private abuse.233 In step one, 
CEDAW’s requirement of non-discrimination demands a comparison 
between women and men, and may require an expansion of rights for 
women. Turning to step two, the provision of a forum for 
documented women workers to bring complaints against their 
employers would then require undocumented women workers to be 
given access to it as well, as a part of their labor rights (using the 
 231. See supra Part II.C.iii. 
 232. See Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 111 (declaring that the Court will apply the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination to undocumented workers). 
 233. Cf. supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing holding a CEDAW 
State Party responsible for failure to protect women from battering, in part due to 
lack of effective judicial mechanisms). Provisions that require migrant workers to 
pay large sums to remain in a State in order to bring a complaint might similarly be 
held to violate CEDAW, if these provisions disproportionately impact women. See 
supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
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second comparator group: documented and undocumented women 
workers). As the Inter-American Court expressly recognized, “even 
though an undocumented migrant worker could face deportation, 
[she] should always have the right to be represented before a 
competent body so that [she] is recognized all the labor rights [she] 
has acquired as a worker.”234
Furthermore, a migrant worker acquires rights from the 
employment relationship, regardless of whether the employer is the 
State or a private party.235 Thus, if CEDAW requires a State to adopt 
measures to monitor recruitment agencies and private employers,236 
these labor protections regulating private relationships apply equally 
to undocumented workers. So long as documented women migrant 
workers have gained labor rights due to CEDAW, undocumented 
women migrant workers would gain the labor rights as well. 
In sum, whenever advocates use the provisions of CEDAW to 
effectively argue for a change in domestic law affecting labor rights, 
the expansion in labor rights will then apply to undocumented 
migrant women by virtue of their employment relationship. The 
primary flaw of my argument is its dependence on States providing 
at least some labor rights for lawful male workers. As previously 
discussed, because CEDAW is a non-discrimination treaty, women 
are guaranteed rights on an equal basis with men. Thus, for example, 
if male workers lawfully within a country lack the right to overtime 
pay, it would be difficult for women to claim this right under 
CEDAW, as they are only guaranteed rights on an equal basis with 
men. Under my analysis, male worker rights lead to increased rights 
for women workers under CEDAW. This expansion of labor rights to 
female workers then leads to rights for undocumented women 
workers under the OP-18 framework. 
There are two responses to this potential flaw. First, most states 
with large populations of migrant workers do have labor codes 
providing rights to workers.237 These codes provide the basis that 
 234. Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 159. 
 235. See id. ¶ 140 (describing the State’s obligation to ensure that private 
employers comply with human rights decisions). 
 236. See supra Part II.D (discussing State obligations to regulate private actors, 
and to prevent them from discriminating against women migrant workers). 
 237. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
2009] A RIGHTS BASED APPROACH 893 
 
leads to increased rights for women workers under CEDAW, because 
the exclusion of domestic workers from these codes violates the 
Convention. Second, even where male workers are not granted 
certain labor rights, CEDAW’s guarantee of substantive equality 
may allow women to claim these rights in order to achieve 
substantive equality in the workplace.238 Because of biological 
differences between men and women, along with different levels of 
discrimination that women have faced, women might need more 
labor rights than men in order to be able to participate equally in the 
workforce. Therefore women might be able to claim that a state must 
grant them pregnancy leave, although male workers do not have this 
right.239 Even where a state provided absolutely no labor rights for 
workers, men might still be more protected in the workplace because 
of existing societal attitudes and historical discrimination towards 
women.240 Under a substantive equality approach, a State might need 
to provide women with certain labor rights, merely to afford them a 
substantively equal opportunity to participate in the workforce with 
men, regardless of whether male workers are guaranteed any rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Migrant Workers’ Convention lacks teeth because of 
the small number of states that have ratified it,241 advocates for 
women migrant workers in the 185 State Parties to CEDAW need 
look no further than that Convention to hold States accountable for 
protecting and fulfilling the human rights of women migrant workers 
within their territories. Because the Convention provides for a 
guarantee of substantive equality between women and men, and 
because States have an obligation to take “all appropriate measures” 
to eliminate discrimination by private persons,242 CEDAW obliges 
States to take appropriate measures where discrimination 
disproportionately impacts women. For example, many migrant 
worker abuses—such as labor codes that exclude domestic workers 
from labor protections, or employers who lock women migrant 
 238. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 3. 
 239. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing Family and 
Medical Leave Act and substantive equality). 
 240. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (observing that de jure 
equality does not immediately cure the effects of long term discrimination). 
 241. See Status of the Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 60. 
 242. CEDAW, supra note 20, art. 2. 
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workers in the house, steal their passports, and refuse to allow a day 
off—occur in the domestic service sector, and disproportionately 
impact women workers. A State incurs obligations under CEDAW 
that may require a change in domestic law, the development of a 
regulatory framework to monitor private employers and migrant 
recruitment agencies, and access to the judiciary or another 
competent tribunal in order to bring abuses to light. A state may have 
a duty to investigate such complaints, and provide redress. 
CEDAW’s protections extend beyond obligations towards 
documented migrant workers. CEDAW’s protections may on their 
face extend to all women within the State Party’s territory; this 
argument and its counterarguments, although addressed briefly in 
this paper,243 should be developed further in a future piece of 
scholarship. At a minimum, however, the use of CEDAW to expand 
domestic labor protections for documented women workers will 
improve protections for undocumented workers as well, based on the 
Advisory Opinion 18 analysis that the employment relationship 
obligates a State to guarantee labor rights to undocumented migrant 
workers.244 A State has every right not to grant employment to an 
undocumented migrant, but once the employment relationship has 
begun, the State incurs an obligation towards the worker. Setting up 
a framework to monitor recruitment agencies and private employers 
may help a State both fulfill its obligations towards women under 
CEDAW, as well as reduce the number of undocumented migrant 
workers within its borders. Although the Advisory Opinion 18 
analysis at present applies only to State Parties to the Inter-American 
Convention, it is the most thorough, well-reasoned analysis of 
migrant worker human rights that presently exists, and other human 
rights tribunals considering undocumented migrant workers should 
move to adopt it. 
This Article set out to build on the work of previous scholars who 
have encouraged migrant worker advocates to look beyond the 
Migrant Workers’ Convention. As I have demonstrated, CEDAW 
provides a particularly compelling source of rights for women 
migrant workers. Migrant workers and their advocates should use the 
 243. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 136 (explaining that illegal immigrants cannot be discriminated 
against because of their undocumented status once they have been employed). 
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Convention to argue for changes in domestic law, and should bring 
complaints through the Optional Protocol system,245 so that the Ewis, 
Melda, Ariantis, and Anis of the world no longer face the kind of 
abuse that is all too common for migrant women.246
 
 
 
 
 245. See Optional Protocol, supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 246. Supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
